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Abstract
Current intrusion detection systems (IDS) generate a large number of specific
alerts, but do not provide actionable information. Many times, these alerts must be
analyzed by a network defender, a time consuming and tedious task which can occur
hours or days after an attack. Improved understanding of the cyberspace domain can
lead to great advancements in cyberspace situational awareness research and devel-
opment. This thesis applies the Cross Industry Standard Process for Data Mining
(CRISP-DM) to develop an understanding about a host system under attack. Data is
generated by launching scans and exploits at a machine outfitted with a set of host-
based data collectors. Through knowledge discovery, features are identified within
the data collected which can be used to enhance host-based intrusion detection. By
discovering relationships between the data collected and controlled events, false pos-
itive alerts were reduced by over 91% when compared to a leading open source IDS.
This method of searching for hidden forensic evidence relationships enhances under-
standing of novel attacks and vulnerabilities, bolstering ones ability to defend the
cyberspace domain. The methodology presented in this thesis, as well as the features
identified, can be used to further situational awareness research.
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Developing Cyberspace Data Understanding:
Using CRISP-DM for
Host-based IDS Feature Mining
I. Introduction
Cyberspace situational awareness research is an effort to build and refine human
understanding of the cyberspace domain, the globally interconnected set of comput-
ing and communication resources upon which the Department of Defense (DoD) relies
upon for carrying out its mission. There are a number of motivations for enhancing
cyberspace situational awareness. Among these are the DoD’s increased reliance upon
the cyberspace domain, the continually expanding arsenal of cyberspace threats, and
the tradeoffs between cyberspace threat detection effectiveness versus efficiency and
human understanding. The focus of this document is on developing understand-
ing, specifically related to host-based intrusion detection, and to determine if such a
methodology could be used to focus the operator to the most pertinent alerts.
1.1 Cyberspace as a Center of Gravity.
Carl Von Clausewitz [25], an early 19th century military strategic theorist, orig-
inated the concept of centers of gravity (COG), as a “hub of all power and movement
upon which everything depends”. The DoD’s increased reliance upon cyberspace for
accomplishing both support and operational tasks arguably positions cyberspace as
its most critical COG. Cyberspace permeates air, land, sea and space operations.
Cyberspace systems are force multipliers; by automating tedious administrative tasks
and increasing the depth and breadth of day to day information sharing, military per-
sonnel are able to accomplish “more with less”. Command and control (C2) systems
provide synergistic effects, whether through advanced workflow systems for coordi-
nating and disseminating orders, or by enhanced heads up display systems for tacti-
cal, operational and strategic decision makers. In a time of war, the GIG’s massive
1
bandwidth enables unprecedented speed for providing enhanced situational awareness
capabilities such as unmanned aerial vehicle or precision guided munitions video feeds.
Not only a critical enabler to joint warfare, the projection of cyberspace power for
coordinated efforts provides an awesome advantage over less technologically advanced
combatant forces. The joint warfighter’s ability to get the right information to the
right people at the right time in a trusted means is critical to deterring war and, when
necessary, projecting power to protect national security interests.
1.2 Cyberspace Vulnerabilities.
The more complex and interconnected/interdependent systems become, the
harder it is to secure them. Each new entry point, whether physical or virtual, in-
troduces a set of potential vulnerabilities which must be hardened against malicious
use. To make matters worse, it could take as little as just one vulnerability in the
collective to provide the means by which an attacker can cause massive damage.
Even as the number and complexity of ubiquitous computing platforms are on
the rise, software development has been increasingly outsourced. At the end of fiscal
year (FY) 1994, the United States Air Force had 2,892 “blue-suit” (USAF military)
computer programmers. By the end of FY 2008, the Air Force was down to 921
blue-suit programmers, one-third of its 1994 population [2]. Almost all of the hard-
ware and software systems the Air Force depends upon to accomplish its mission are
acquired as commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions. Desktop computers, network
equipment and mobile computing devices, server software, operating systems and of-
fice automation suites are each purchased in this way. The Air Force lets countless
contracts to build, install and maintain custom software solutions, in the form of
stand-alone, client/server or internet applications in an effort to deliver long-term
monetary savings to the government.
The problem with this trend with regard to systems security is that one does
not know for sure that the software is built to do only what it is intended to do. How
much does one know about another’s development process? Do they follow secure
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software development best practices? Does one know if these hardware and software
platforms are introducing (intentionally or unintentionally) vulnerabilities to be ex-
ploited? Industry experts [41] say that a person cannot trust the security of software
they did not develop themselves. The trusted computing initiative attempts to ad-
dress these problems, but it has been shown that the security of a computer system
is undecidable at best since it is unknown what emerging vulnerabilities linger on the
horizon. Put another way, threat protection is highly experiential – an computing
system cannot protect itself against threats it has never encountered or anticipated.
1.3 Threats to Cyberspace.
Unfortunately, adversaries know of the DoD’s reliance upon the cyberspace do-
main and its vulnerabilities, and is working hard to level the playing field and even
to gain the advantage through information warfare tactics. Without engineering cy-
berspace to assure confidentiality, integrity, availability (CIA), the DoD loses a critical
asymmetric advantage over a less advanced combatant force. Cyber threats have a
goal to disrupt, degrade or deny the CIA of DoD computer networks. All-too-common
attack methods include distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, deployment of
viruses, spyware, rootkits or “botnet zombies”, and interactive exploitation (hacking)
of known software/hardware vulnerabilities such as causing buffer overflows to gain
control of a computer system. Once a system is compromised, it can be used by
the attacker as a jumping off point to another, deeper network attack, or to pilfer
information for malicious use.
1.4 Threat Detection.
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) play a major role in cyberspace threat de-
tection. An IDS is a software or hardware system which automates the process of
monitoring events occurring in a computer system or network, analyzing them for
signs of security problems [13]. The two main types of IDS are signature based IDS
and anomaly detection IDS.
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A signature-based IDS performs well for detecting known threats, but cannot
properly identify a novel threat; it must have a signature in its database which exactly
matches a given threat in order to detect it. System administrators must constantly
update threat-detection signatures to keep up with the ever expanding threat pool.
Additionally, detecting a network attack solely through signature-based systems has
been shown infeasible [38]. As quickly as a signature is created for an exploit, a hacker
can unleash a slightly different version, a variant, requiring a completely new signature
for detection. This is why zero day exploits are widely successful; a signature has
either not been created, or cannot be deployed in time to prevent all possible damage.
Given the DoD’s heavy dependence upon cyberspace, the vulnerable nature of
cyberspace, and the multitude of threats which aim to undermine its confidentiality,
integrity and availability, continued research of this volatile domain is paramount.
1.5 Research Overview
1.5.1 Problem Domain. One major difficulty facing the cyber situational
awareness research community relates to the massive dimensionality of the threat
search space. Due to the expanse of the cyberspace domain and the limitations of
processing power, the environment is only partially-observable. Stated otherwise, it is
infeasible to permute all combinations of sensor data in real time, sensors need to be
wisely chosen for the system to attend to. Finding an optimal feature subset for build-
ing a classifier has been shown to be an intractable problem [43], and many problems
related to feature selection have been shown to be NP-hard [51]. Theoretically, given
infinite time, sensors, storage and computing power, perfect situational awareness can
be derived. Of course this is not the case; any situational awareness obtained will be
constrained by the resources allocated and the time bounds acceptable to solving the
problem. Situational awareness is concerned not only with its effectiveness, but also
its efficiency.
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1.5.2 Past Research Summary. Given that signature-based sensors are not
feasible for detecting all threats, researchers must consider alternative solutions. Re-
searchers have proposed threat detection methods, attacking the problem from various
angles over the years; a representational few of these are discussed further in Chapter
II. The bulk of the research efforts for threat detection thus far focuses on developing
methods relying solely on network traffic [16] [46] [47] [11] [36] [38], solely on event
logs [52] [69] [63], or solely on system calls [34] [55]. Surprisingly, no research efforts
thus far has attempted to combine data from various system sensor categories, such
as file I/O, network traffic and process meta data, in order to form a larger picture of
what data is most relevant for the identification of threats. The fusion of multi-sensor
data is studied at great length [15], but not toward the understanding of what data
is most important to identifying specific cyberspace threats. Situational awareness
research aims to bring together raw data to formulate higher levels of understand-
ing. This requires transforming the data from its raw form into data which provides
decision-quality information.
1.5.3 Problem Statement and Hypothesis. A problem which continues to
plague intrusion detection systems is a high incident of false positive alerts, the alert-
ing of malicious activity when it is not actually present. A system administrator must
filter through these false alerts in order to find and act upon alerts which pertain to
truly malicious activity. In order to improve the accuracy of an IDS and ease the bur-
den on system administration personnel, a methodology for reducing the incidence of
false positive alerts, while still accurately identifying malicious events, is needed.
This thesis presents a methodology to expand cyberspace data understanding for
the purpose of improving threat detection accuracy. By identifying relevant features
from an array of sensor data elements, this methodology identifies not only if a system
is under attack or not, but also what stage of an attack is occurring.
The research hypothesis is that the discovery of correlated forensic evidence in
data to a known attack event, the most relevant sets of features to attend to can be
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identified. Knowledge of which sets of features an IDS should attend to can greatly
decrease the incidence of false positive alerts while still accurately, and economically,
identifying malicious events.
1.5.4 Experiments. A small network laboratory is established consisting of
a two machines: a target machine and an attack machine. The target machine is
outfitted with a number of open source sensors to monitor network activity, system
events and changes in process meta data. The attack machine is loaded with a number
of malicious tools which can be used to scan the target machine for vulnerabilities
and launch exploits to take advantage of these vulnerabilities.
Data is collected by activating the target machine’s sensors and executing a
scripted series of events. These events simulate normal, scanning and exploition
activities as the target machine’s sensors capture data to a repository.
A Java-based framework is developed to parse and consolidate thousands of
sensor-generated files into a raw set of features to analyze, aggregated into two sec-
ond time windows to allow for data alignment. The framework is built to be extend-
able, allowing for the incorporation of new sensors based upon new or changing data
requirements.
A Microsoft SQL Database is used to aggregate events into two-second time-
frames, and to analyze both continuous and discrete features. Numeric features are
compared statistically, to include differences between min, max, mean, variance, skew-
ness and kurtosis. A comparison of the statistical differences between normal, scan-
ning and exploitation activity is performed. Numeric features are only selected if their
measures are significantly outside those of normal activity. A set selection method is
used to analyze discrete features. Features which are in either the scanning or exploit
collection, but not in the normal collection (or occur in much higher aggregated in-
cidence than in the normal collection) were correlated against experiment events at
the time. Selected features were used to label data as normal, scanning or attack.
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A MATLAB neural network is trained and then used to classify, in an unbiased
manner, records of the selected features. The performance and classification accuracy
of the neural network is analyzed. Labeled data was manually cross-referenced against
the scripted events to determine false positive and false negative alerts the feature set
generated. Results were compared to alerts generated by a leading open source IDS.
1.5.5 Assumptions and Limitations. The following are assumptions and
known limitations of this research:
Controlled Environment For research and analysis purposes, and due to the po-
tential damaging consequences of performing network attacks on a “live” net-
work, experiments are carried out in an isolated computer lab environment.
Experiments use pre-scripted simulations of a small subset of normal, scanning
and exploit activity, and do not represent the totality of activities which can be
executed on (or against) a host machine. Collections are additionally focused
on monitoring one system, not a series of systems or their network. Due to
these facts, resulting feature selection and classification data is considered bi-
ased toward the operating system monitored during experimentation, selected
attack tools and sensors, and the events in the scripts. However, since this thesis
applies a methodology which can be extended, it serves as a proof of concept
versus a deliverable IDS platform. Additional collections across many systems
including varied events will likely produce different results.
Sensor Impact To System The selected methodology involves the collection of a
live system’s internal forensic data, which involves execution of programs and
persisting data to the target system. While care is used to select lightweight
sensors over more burdensome ones, sensor activity impact collections in two
ways. First, the system being monitored is running additional programs to sense
the host environment, which utilizes system resources such as the machine’s pro-
cessor(s), memory, and hard drive. Second, collected data reflects information
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pertaining to sensor activity. These facts should be taken into account during
later stages of the experiment.
Partial Observable Environment Given the size of the search space and the lim-
itations of processing power and the sensors selected, the host environment is
only partially observable. Stated otherwise, it is infeasible to observe all possible
portions of system’s state in real time. Given this fact, care is taken to choose
sensors which both provide a unique view of the search space in order to provide
as much forensic evidence as possible. Optimality conditions for sensor selec-
tion include consistency, completeness, speed, and resource overhead. While no
formal method is used to select sensors for observing the target environment,
these conditions were taken into account.
1.5.6 Results and Conclusions. Results show that the methodology pre-
sented in this thesis improved classification of host-based events by 91% fewer false
positive/false when compared to a leading open source intrusion detection system for
a set of controlled attack experiments. The improved accuracy not only aids in the
identification of malicious events, but also reduces administrative burden for network
defenders who would have to manually filter through false alerts to find truly relevant
events. The application of the CRISP-DM process is an effective means by which to
discover hidden data relationships within forensic evidence.
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II. Literature Review
To support this body of work, an understanding of related work in the area of the
threat detection problem, as it pertains to cyberspace situational awareness, must be
developed. Pertinent areas of research within the scope include, but are not limited
to: intrusion detection systems, cyberspace situational awareness systems, knowledge
discovery and artificial intelligence.
As a nation and a profession of arms, the United States and USAF rely heav-
ily upon the cyberspace domain. However, time and time again, one learns all too
painfully of the vulnerabilities and varied threats to cyberspace. Hundreds of solutions
have been applied to the threat detection problem; development of data understanding
is one method in a consistently growing area of intrusion detection research.
2.1 The Cyberspace Domain
The Cyberspace domain is characterized by “the use of electronics and the
electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems
and associated physical infrastructures” [24].” As mentioned in Joint Publication (JP)
6-0 [7], Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Sys-
tems Support to Joint Operations, the Global Information Grid (GIG) is “the globally
interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and
personnel for acquiring, processing, storing, transporting, controlling, and presenting
information on demand to joint forces and support personnel.” The GIG includes “all
owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (in-
cluding applications), data, security services, and other associated services necessary
to achieve information superiority.” Cyberspace is utilized across air, land, sea and
space domains. In other words, the GIG is the infrastructure upon which all digital
operations the Air Force and its partners rely upon to carry out the mission, from
administrative tasks to full-scale operations.
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2.1.1 Cyberspace Priorities. There are four strategic priorities listed by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff related to Cyberspace [24]:
• Gain and maintain initiative to operate within adversary decision cycles.
• Integrate cyberspace capabilities across the range of military operations.
• Build capacity for cyberspace operations.
• Manage risk for operations in cyberspace.
While this work pertains to each of the Chairman’s four priorities, it is most rele-
vant to the latter two. First, the capacity for cyberspace operations relies heavily upon
gaining and maintaining information superiority. The methodology demonstrated in
this work can be applied toward enhancing information superiority, specifically with
regard to host-based intrusion detection. Second, the expansion of cyberspace data
understanding through this and similar works aid in the detection of threats, risky
software or computing practices, which can be applied to managing risk for operations
in cyberspace.
2.1.2 Cyber Center of Gravity (COG). As mentioned in Chapter 1, Carl
Von Clausewitz [25] originated the concept of centers of gravity concept as a “hub
of all power and movement upon which everything depends.” JP 1-02 [5], Doctrine
for Joint Planning Operations, further defines a center of gravity as a “source of
power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.” JP
5-0 [6], Joint Operation Planning, states that the most important task confronting
planners in this process is “being able to identify friendly and adversary strategic
centers of gravity; that is, the sources of strength, power, and resistance. This task
is critical because “faulty analysis of friendly or adversary centers of gravity can
have very serious consequences; specifically, the inability to accomplish the military
objectives at an acceptable cost and the unconscionable expenditure of lives, time,
and materiel in efforts that do not produce decisive strategic or operational results.
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Military theorists have identified four major powers, or centers of gravity, which a
nation state can use to influence another nation state:
• Military power: Capability to apply military arms to project violence.
• Political power: Diplomatic capacity and public support.
• Industrial: Ability to manufacture and sell goods
• Economic: Monetary reserves (and currency valuation within global market).
JP 6-0 [7] states that command and control (C2) consists of two elements:
people, and (collectively) C2 facilities, systems, communications, procedures. JP 6-0
also states that “C2 is essentially about information: getting it, judging its value,
processing it into useful form, acting on it, and sharing it with others.” Of the two
basic uses for information, the first is to “help create situational awareness (SA) as the
basis for a decision.” The second is to direct and coordinate actions in the execution
of the decision.
Certainly, the Cyberspace Domain provides a source of strength, power and
resistance for the DoD. It is a critical COG, as cyberspace permeates throughout
the DoD mission. It may also be the DoD’s most vulnerable COG: like the space
domain, cyberspace has no definitive borders. However, unlike space, cyberspace is
accessible at a very low cost, and can be exploited from any one or a group of millions
of interconnected phones, radios and computers. Unfortunately, our enemies know
this as well, and are actively pursuing ways to undermine this most critical center
of gravity. The DoD’s most important asset, without regard to its people, is its
information. The DoD operates networks with varying levels of security classification.
2.1.3 Vulnerabilities. Computers and networks expose a number of vul-
nerabilities which can be exploited by malicious parties. Among these are physical,
system/network, personnel, and software vulnerabilities.
Physical Vulnerabilities. Lack of physical protection of computing assets and
information is the most basic vulnerability. When discussion about physical vul-
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nerabilities arises, one typically thinks of physical access to business office, network
operations control area and server room security. However, with today’s pervasive
and ubiquitous computing capabilities, physical vulnerabilities are now extended into
personal residences, automobiles and even on a person. A laptop or mobile comput-
ing device left unsecured from theft can present a golden opportunity to the would-be
intruder. The Washington Post [56] reported on a disturbing trend in Chicago indi-
cates up to 160,000 mobile devices (cell phones, blackberries, etc) are left behind in
city taxi cabs, but only 50–60% of those ever get reunited with their owner. They
further cited a related survey done by Symantec which indicated that up to 37 per-
cent of those devices potentially contain confidential business data; in Chicago alone,
this would result in 26,640 potential breaches in security. Examples of breakdowns
in physical security potentially affecting military personnel include the now infamous
2006 Veteran’s Administration “stolen” laptop which contained privacy act records of
26.5 million past and present U.S. service members, and the 2009 discovery [26] of an
MP3 player purchased for $9 from a pawn shop which contained personnel data and
mission briefs from active theaters of operations. An unsecured asset which falls into
the wrong hands can yield disastrous consequences, from identity theft to operational
compromise which can result in the loss of human life.
Personnel Vulnerabilities However, in the hands of an untrained, negligent, or
malicious user, these protections can easily be incorrectly configured, disregarded
or potentially subverted. If users improperly install, configure or maintain a sys-
tem, they expose their systems to vulnerabilities that could have been otherwise
mitigated. Some examples of these negligent acts include not changing the default
password for administrator accounts, not disabling/deleting guest accounts, not set-
ting web browser security settings appropriately, not keeping system patched against
newly discovered vulnerabilities, implementing weak password policies, and utilizing
no/weak encryption. Examples of malicious user activity are discussed in Section
2.1.4.
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Computer System/Network Vulnerabilities. A computer typically has an oper-
ating system such as Microsoft Windows or Ubuntu Linux, office automation software
like Microsoft Office or OpenOffice suites, application software such as Mozilla Fire-
fox or Adobe Illustrator, antivirus and/or personal firewall software, entertainment
and/or other software. Collectively, thousands of files compete for resources and com-
municate internally with each other and across networks. Particularly with operating
systems and applications which communicate across a network, many programs have
user-configurable protection mechanisms intended to provide users the capability to
minimize their exposure to vulnerabilities. Likewise, networking hardware such as
routers, switches and firewalls each have software which set rules for systems, ports
and protocols allowed to communicate across them.
Software Vulnerabilities. Computer systems communicate with each other across
shared infrastructure using standard protocols. Because of the open standards com-
munication systems use, it becomes imperative to ensure only safe (and authenticated
as appropriate) communication takes place, and programs should properly handle any
exceptions that arise from malformed inputs. Unless a computer system’s programs
are developed with security in mind from the beginning, they likely contain exploitable
vulnerabilities. Malicious user inputs to such programs can subvert the security of the
system, allowing an attacker to disrupt, deny or degrade the confidentiality, integrity
or availability of the victim’s system. Howard, et al. [41] describe in great detail the
nineteen “deadly sins” of software security, as summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: 19 Deadly Sins of Software Security [41].
19 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Vulnerability Coding Sin
Buffer Overruns Failure to validate array boundaries before read/write
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.1 – Continued
Vulnerability Coding Sin
Format String Problems Failure to validate user input for malicious format string
sequences before returning data
Integer Overflows Failure to check for integer over/underflow conditions
when performing mathematical operations or casting
data types
SQL Injection Failure to validate user input for malicious SQL state-
ments
Command Injection Failure to validate user input for malicious command
statements
Failing to Handle Errors Failure to ensure errors are appropriately handled
Cross-Site Scripting Failure to validate user input for malicious HTML
Failing to Protect Network
Traffic
Failure to use secure protocols for communication
Use of Magic URLs and
Hidden Form Fields
Failure to avoid using magic URLs and hidden form
fields to transmit sensitive information
Improper Use of SSL and
TLS
Failure to validate certificates, chain of trust and check
certificate revocation
Use of Weak Password-
Based Systems
Failure to strongly encrypt passwords for transmission
and/or storage
Failing to Store and Protect
Data Securely
Using weak access control mechanisms or hard-coding
secret data
Information Leakage Failure to protect sensitive information from inadvertent
disclosure
Improper File Access Failure to verify user access to files or protect against
directory traversal attacks
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.1 – Continued
Vulnerability Coding Sin
Trusting Network Name
Resolution
Reliance upon Domain Name Service or similar service,
which may be compromised or spoofed, for establishing
connections
Race Conditions Failure to avoid race conditions between threads or pro-
cesses
Unauthenticated Key Ex-
change
Failure to validate sender identity during key exchange
Cryptographically Weak
Random Numbers
Using pseudo-random number generation for cryptogra-
phy
Poor Usability Designing a non-intuitive or overly complex user inter-
face, especially for setting security features
2.1.3.1 Hacking Tools. There are thousands of tools hackers can use to
discover systems and their vulnerabilities, crack passwords and exploit system security
deficiencies. Over the years, system administrators developed tools for centralized or
remote troubleshooting and administration of network systems and user accounts.
Unfortunately, in the hands of a hacker, these tools provide invaluable insights which
can be used for malicious ends. A few of the prominent tools as listed by Insecure.org
[8] are highlighted in Table 2.2.
2.1.4 Threats. Lt. Gen. William Shelton, the Air Force’s Chief Informa-
tion Officer, recently briefed the House Armed Services Committee panel, “Threats
in cyberspace move at the speed of light, and we are literally under attack every day
as networks are constantly probed and adversaries seek to exploit vulnerabilities.”
Threats come in many forms, some from direct interaction by hackers, others via pro-
grams or tools developed by hackers. Some of the main threats to the confidentiality,
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Table 2.2: Common tools used by hackers to discover host systems, enumerate and
exploit their vulnerabilities.
Google The ubiquitous search engine of choice for hackers can
be used to obtain corporate knowledge, akin to dump-
ster diving, to learn things such as employee names and
unsecured sensitive information about communications
systems and programs
Nmap Program which performs host and port scanning to dis-
cover machines and services running on a network
Dsniff Suite of network auditing and penetration testing pro-
grams
Nessus Vulnerability assessment tool for Unix and Windows
Wireshark Network protocol analyzer for Unix and Windows
Metasploit Framework for developing, testing and deploying exploit
code
Tcpdump /
Windump
Network packet sniffer for Unix / Windows
Cain and
Abel
Password cracking tool for Windows
Ping Tool which tests ability to reach a specific machine by
IP Address
Netstat Displays protocol statistics and current network connec-
tions
Tracert Displays network route between querying machine and
target machine by IP Address
SSH Secure terminal emulator for remotely interacting with
command line
SysInternals A suite of Microsoft Windows tools (ProcessExplorer,
PsTools, Autoruns, RootkitRevealer, TCPView among
others) for monitoring activity on a system.
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integrity and availability of DoD networks include malware, denial of service attacks
and insider threats. At the root of each of these threats is the hacker.
2.1.4.1 Hackers. An understanding of the hacker mindset, to include
motivations and how hackers view systems, is important to establishing effective de-
tection techniques. Gregg, et al. [37] discusses various types of hackers, thier moti-
vations and varying levels of expertise. There are three main categories of hackers:
whitehat, blackhat and grayhat. Whitehat hackers perform “ethical hacking”: they
employ hacking techniques to uncover security vulnerabilities, and use this informa-
tion to better secure their networks. However, blackhat hackers have the intent of
exploiting security vulnerabilities for malicious ends (disrupt, deny or degrade service,
unauthorized data access or exfiltration, financial theft, etc). Grayhat hackers do a
little of both, have ambiguous loyalties and should not be trusted for whitehat duties.
Blackhat hackers tend to be either means-oriented or goal-oriented.
Means-Oriented Hackers. Means-oriented blackhats are hack-
ers which focus on breaking a particular type or facet of a computer system, and
include phreakers, whackers, software crackers/hackers and system crackers/hackers.
Phreakers are the original hackers, who took advantage of weaknesses in telecommuni-
cations systems with a simple goal: making free phone calls. Whackers are classified
as blackhat hackers who typically focus their skills on attacking wireless networks.
Software crackers/hackers typically use reverse engineering to bypass software licens-
ing, but may also use their skills to subvert other software security mechanisms (such
as encryption) for further exploitation. System cracker/hackers are highly skilled at
attacking vulnerabilities in operating systems; they build worms, viruses and trojans
with the potential for world-wide impact.
Goal-Oriented Hackers. Goal-oriented blackhats focus more on
the ends: they desire computer system compromise in order to accomplish some ob-
jective. Goal-oriented blackhats include script kiddies, disgruntled employees, hack-
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tivists and cyber terrorists/cyber-criminals. Script kiddies are those blackhat hackers
who run pre-built hacking programs (by hackers with better skills) against a target
system; they tend to have no or minimal computer programming experience or skills,
and most likely do not understand how the tools they use work. This does not di-
minish the threat they pose, however. Script kiddies have been known to, among
other things, steal (and use) credit card and banking account information and access
classified government computer systems. A disgruntled employee presents a particu-
larly dangerous threat, as they have not only already been granted access to systems
for the performance of their duties, but an increased potential for employing social
engineering techniques as a “trusted agent” of the organization to gain information
to further exploit systems. Hacktivists are blackhat hackers who have a political mo-
tivation to attack a system. Hacktivists generally deface websites to promote their
political ideology. Cyber terrorists/cyber-criminals are those blackhat hackers who
are paid to attack or exploit assets belonging to governments, corporations or in-
dividuals [37]. Their goals are to generally to exfiltrate sensitive information (e.g.
governmental/corporate espionage) data or to disrupt or deny access to resources.
2.2 Attack Process
A hacker cannot exploit a computer system he/she knows nothing about. In fact,
the process to exploit a system is typically multi-phased, and can occur very quickly
(and noisily from a sensor perspective) or span days or weeks (and stealthy from a
sensor perspective, “low and slow” to avoid automated detection). In order to exploit
systems on a network, a hacker must first learn what systems are reachable, what
services are hosted by the reachable systems, and discover potential vulnerabilities
through the identification of installed software versions and patch levels. Some of
these steps may be bypassed due to data gleaned from dumpster diving, web surfing or
social engineering tactics. Depending upon the goals of an attack, and the knowledge
the attacker has on hand, an attacker will carry out one or more of the following
stages of attack processes. McClure, et al. formally categorize attack stages into
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Figure 2.1: McClure, et al’s. “Anatomy of a Hack” (adopted from [53]).
footprinting, scanning, enumeration, gaining access, escalating privilege, pilfering,
covering tracks, creating back doors, and denial of service activities; the process flow
is depicted in Figure 2.1 [53]. Gregg [37] offers an almost identical process, but uses
the term reconnaissance in place of footprinting, and does not address pilfering and
denial of service as formal stages of the attack process.
2.2.1 Footprinting. The first stage of an attack process, footprinting, is
to farm through publicly available information to build a profile of the organization’s
security posture. This farming is typically aimed at learning ways to intrude the orga-
nization’s internet, intranet, extranet and remote access environments [37]. By using
a variety of tools and data sources, a hacker can learn domain names, network blocks
and subnets, DSN hostnames, system architecture, protocols used, and other clues
that provide starting points within the environment to later map out the network [53].
To footprint a network, a hacker may start by querying information listed by domain
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registrars and DNS servers (e.g. via whois or nslookup), or may attempt to gain
insights by web searching for postings linked to the organization (e.g. organization’s
public website, third party blogs, job or alternative sites, or via Google hacking [37].
Other tactics a hacker may use to discover information about an organization’s en-
vironment include dumpster diving, web surfing or social engineering tactics such as
phishing [53].
2.2.2 Scanning. The second stage of an attack process is scanning. During
the scanning stage, a hacker scans a network to determine what systems are reachable.
The attacker implements various ping utilities such as fping or hping; port scanners
such as FoundStone’s SuperScan or ScanLine programs, or operating system detection
utilities such as amap or sinFP. Nmap, and its graphical version Zenmap, provides
all of these scanning capabilities in one package. NetCat is a unix-based tool which
provides these capabilities and more, but the Windows UDP scanner is unreliable [53].
Scanners work by sending basic ping requests in search of ping replies (for example,
sending a ICMP ECHO request to elicit an ICMP ECHO REPLY). A reply indicates
discovery of a host. Also, firewalls may block some of these types of requests as they
are detected.
Once a hacker identifies hosts which are alive, they focus scanning efforts to look
for open TCP and/or UDP ports on the systems. To do this, a hacker sends network
packets to ports on the host machine in order to elicit the appropriate response. There
are eight basic TCP scan types: TCP connect scan, TCP SYN scan, FIN scan, TCP
Xmas Tree scan, TCP Null scan, TCP ACK scan, TCP Windows scan and TCP
RPC scans. TCP connect scans are easily detectable, so hackers developed these
other “connectionless” scans. Some of the scans work in a standard way based on
their RFC, but others, such as the TCP FIN scan, TCP Windows scan and TCP
RPC scan respond in an operating system-specific way or do not work at all on some
operating systems. A UDP scan to an open port will result in no response and to a
closed port will result in an ICMP port unreachable message. [53]
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Hackers can determine what operating system is installed on a machine. Some
of this “operating system fingerprinting” can be attained by observing which ports
were open on the machine; a Windows host typically listens on ports 135 and 139.
Fingerprinting is enhanced through sending a series of probes to open ports and
monitoring the feedback received from the ports. For example, an attacker may send
a FIN probe (a packet to an open TCP port with the FIN bit set). If the machine
is Windows NT, Windows 200X or Windows Vista, it will respond with a FIN/ACK
packet, which is not the standard response per RFC 793. Other probes look for the
use of “don’t fragment bit”, the TCP initial window size, the length of ICMP quoted
messages. Nuances in how an operating system handles TCP packets help an attacker
to fingerprint the operating system. This information is invaluable to narrowing the
scope of which vulnerabilities to search for.
2.2.3 Enumeration. Enumeration is the third stage of an attack, and is
characterized as targeted queries to a host’s ports in order to learn more about what
service is running on it. One way to enumerate services is through banner grabbing
through utilities such as telnet or netcat. For example, by attempting to open and
use a telnet connection to an open port discovered during the scanning step, a hacker
can monitor feedback from the target system to glean information about the service
running on the port (such as protocol and version). Nessus, a vulnerability scanner,
goes a step further. Nessus scans a system’s ports to determine what services are
running ion but also tell what specific vulnerabilities a system is susceptable to is the
Nessus program. Nessus is a vulnerability scanner, which roots out , and can even
Once a hacker finds a reachable system, the next goal is to determine which ports, pro-
tocols and services the system supports. This helps the attacker determine potential
vulnerabilities. [53] Other enumeration techniques include querying ports with FTP,
querying DNS information about a using nslookup (from a Windows machine), or
using native Unix utility programs such as finger (against Unix-based targets) or ls -d
¡domain name¿ to query DSN zone transfer information about a network. Enumera-
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tion techniques exist for all sorts of specialized services such as NetBIOS, HyperText
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), RPC, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP),
Structured Query Language (SQL); McClure lists enumeration for these services and
more in [53].
2.2.4 Gaining access. The next stage of an attack is gaining access. Once a
malicious party discovers a vlunerability on your system, there are many tools avail-
able exploit the weakness in order to gain access. Once such tool is MetaSploit [53].
A hacker need only browse through the MetaSploit vulnerabilities database through
the user interface, select a payload, set an option or two (e.g. target machine and
stealth settings), and the payload is launched as requested. Some payloads perform
a specific action such as adding an admin account, others provide a reverse shell con-
nection to allow the hacker to log on to the target machine with System privileges.
At that point, the target machine is pretty much at the whims of the remote user,
and the system should be considered completely compromised if this type of access is
detected.
2.2.5 Escalation of privilege. If gaining initial access is not enough to
accommodate the hackers goals, the hacker typically attempts to gain additional
privilege by accessing password databases using tools like ophcrack, Cain or other
password cracking tool, or by searching through files looking for passwords which
provide additional access [53].
2.2.6 Pilfering. Depending on the hacker’s goal, they may want to use
their initial breach as a stepping off point to deeper penetration. Pilfering involves
searching the network for additional passwords, trust relationships with neighboring
networks, or system vulnerabilities that may not have been visible or exposed to the
attacker prior to the breach. Tools such as Cain & Abel and simple file searching can
yield just the type of insider information the intruder needs to gain further access [53].
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2.2.7 Covering Tracks. To prevent prosecution or to enable repeat visits
without arising suspicion from network administrators, a hacker may desire to cover
their tracks by attempting to erase the forensic evidence of their penetration. Covering
tracks may involve clearing logs, altering logs, or hiding tools through file streams or
rootkits [53].
2.2.8 Creating back doors. An attacker may leave behind back door pro-
grams which eases access for a repeat visit or monitors a target (e.g. via keylogging).
Simple measures such as scheduling a job to run after hours which opens a port on
the computer, or replacing an application such as calc.exe with a trojan version [53].
2.2.9 Denial of Service. If the goal of the attacker is to disrupt, degrade
or deny service, they may choose to launch a denial of service attack. Such an at-
tack may flood buffers, send malformed communication to cause a service to fail,
overwhelm system resources via distributed denial of service attacks. According to
Mcclure [53], “DDoS attacks are the most significant operational threat that many
online organizations face today.”
2.3 Sensors
In order to perceive elements within a target domain, sensors must be employed
within the domain’s environment which are capable of detecting and signalling the
occurrence of events. In the air domain, for example, the FAA employs weather and
flight radars, radios and a whole host of digital avionics sensors which are constantly
gathering and reporting data to decision makers: pilots, flight towers and ground
crews, in order to keep the skies safe. Likewise, sensors are employed in various ways
throughout the cyberspace domain.
There are essentially three categories of sensors needed to perceive event fea-
tures on a host in the cyber domain: files, input/output (I/O) streams, and process-
es/memory. Within operating systems, sensors take the form of software programs
23
which monitor resources such as memory, the central processing unit (CPU ), and
network interface cards (NIC ), reporting events such as page faults, network request
timeouts, and input/output errors. Sensors are also used to monitor the security of
the system, reporting events such as privilege escalation, successful or failed login
attempts, and noting when services are started/stopped. Finally, applications often
“sense” and log key application-specific events, such as when they are successfully
started or stopped, or when they complete or fail a noteworthy task, such as a “SQL
Server is now ready for client connections” informational message.
2.3.1 File Sensors. First, file sensors are needed. File sensors should
provide the ability to inspect a file’s contents and/or its properties, such as file size,
its checksum or hash, the date/time last updated or accessed, file size, access control
list, whether it is open or not, how often it is opened, what process/user typically
opens or updates it, fragmentation level, password strength as applicable, etc. Files
range from executable and data files such as notepad.exe or update.txt to operating
system and special files, such as event log files, registry files, or security account
manager files. Individual files may require highly specialized sensors or word parsers
to extract meaning. Examples of this sensor category on a typical Microsoft Windows
platform includes filemon, regmon, event viewer, or custom-built applications which
enumerate Active Directory Service Interface objects, query databases, or execute
various command line entries for directory listings and the like.
2.3.2 I/O Stream Sensors. Second, input/output (I/O) stream sensors are
needed. Typically, one thinks immediately of a network interface card (NIC) sensor,
such as Wireshark, for monitoring network traffic being transmitted to or from a
system or subnet. But there are numerous other I/O devices on a host, such as
USB devices, keyboards, mice, graphic cards, etc. These sensors should provide the
ability to inspect the I/O traffic contents and/or its properties, such as packet size,
protocols used, source and destination for messages, type of message, size of message,
or collective properties such as number of messages/second, volume of traffic, etc.
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Figure 2.2: Types of intrusion detection systems and their related search spaces. [17]
2.3.3 Process and/or Memory Sensors. The third category of host-based
sensors needed is process and/or memory sensors. These sensors should be able to
enumerate the system’s memory contents, and/or its properties, such as memory
addresses, memory allocation, associated process(es), page fault rates, process owner,
number of threads, processor time, etc. Examples of this sensor category include
process monitor, task manager, and performance monitor.
2.4 Intrusion Detection Systems
In 1987, according to Denning, et al., [30] an intrusion detection system (IDS )
monitors network communication to determine whether activity is unusual enough to
suspect an intrusion. However, as Black highlighted [17] twenty years later, and as
covered in Section 2.4.1, there are now several types of IDS. An IDS can be deployed
as a hardware and/or software solution and either use signatures or heuristics for
detecting malicious threats, as discussed in Section 2.4.2.
2.4.1 Types of IDS. There are several types of IDS [17]: Network IDS,
Protocol-based IDS, Application protocol-based IDS, Host-based IDS and Hybrid IDS;
each provides a layer of protection, as summarized in Figure 2.2. A brief description
of each is provided.
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A network IDS (NIDS) analyzes network packets as they are transmitted be-
tween systems [28]. Typically, NIDS are positioned at network boundaries, monitoring
traffic for malicious activity as it enters or leaves a network. When anomalies are de-
tected, a NIDS can take various actions, such as simply logging the event, alerting
administrators or coordinating with a firewall to deny the anomalous traffic. If prop-
erly configured, a NIDS is capable of detecting threats originating from outside or
from within the network such as (but not limited to) DNS spoofing, TCP hijacking,
port scanning, distributed denial of service and data exfiltration [28].
NIDS has a number of shortfalls when it comes to detecting intruder threats.
First, if an attacker obfuscates or encrypts the data they are transmitting, the NIDS
is reduced to analyzing packet headers only; the NIDS’ ability to detect malicious
activity within payload data is severely hampered at best [22]. Second, when it
comes to insider threats, the NIDS would serve as a last line of defense for traffic
leaving the network (and may not be configured to detect host-to-host activity within
the network). However, before network traffic is generated by an insider threat,
there could be readily available tell-tale signs within the affected computer(s) that
anomalous activity has occurred. Since a NIDS only monitors network traffic [28], it
has no access to the internal state of the surveilled machine (e.g. memory, process, file
or registry activity and system, security or application logs) of individual machines on
the network. A more introspective approach is needed for early detection of insider
threats within the malicious activity’s sequence of events.
A leading open source NIDS, Snort [64], is available for download from snort.org.
Snort was first released in 1998, and due to its open source nature, has had hundreds
to thousands of contributors refining the product and its rules ever since. With twelve
years worth of research and development, it is considered the de facto standard in
intrusion detection and prevention [64].
A Protocol-based IDS (PIDS) and application protocol-based IDS (APIDS) are
each similar to NIDS: they both monitor streams of inbound and/or outbound data.
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A PIDS analyzes network packets traveling between systems via a specific port or
protocol. [28] For example, a web server system administrator may wish to employ a
PIDS to analyze traffic coming across port 80 (HTTP) or port 443 (HTTPS), looking
for malformed or malicious web-based queries such as mentioned in [41]: attempts to
cause buffer overflows via lengthy URL strings, attempts to inject execute arbitrary
code using magic URLs, or attempts to exfiltrate sensitive files from the web server
through directory traversal. NIDS tools such as Snort and Bro [44], perform protocol
analysis. An APIDS analyzes the communication via application-specific protocols.
For example, an APIDS could be loaded as middleware between a web server and a
back-end database server, analyzing SQL requests and responses for SQL injects and
cross-site scripting attacks [17]. Both PIDS and APIDS are limited scope intrusion
detection systems. They can protect portions of a system, but will not detect attacks
that happen outside their observable spaces.
A host-based IDS (HIDS) analyzes the activities of internal mechanisms [17]
of a single machine, e.g. its processes, memory, files and event logs to determine
the presence of anomalous activity (as opposed to a traditional antivirus program,
which looks for malicious signatures in files, email and memory [1] for malware).
Specifically, a HIDS monitors interactions with the host operating system, looking
for such things as abnormal processes or user activities which indicate the presence
of malware, unauthorized privilege escalation or other threats. To detect these types
of threats, raw forensic data observations such as system call sequences, file system
modifications, and user logon traces are preferred over higher-level data like event
logs whenever possible. The lower the level of data being analyzed, the deeper the
penetration has to be to avoid detection .
Defense Information Systems Agency’s (DISA) Enterprise-wide Information As-
surance and computer Network Defense Solutions Steering Group (ESSG) procured a
Host-based intrusion prevention system / host based firewall solution, which is dubbed
Host-Based Security System (HBSS). A commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)-based ap-
27
plication written by McAfee, HBSS is to be installed on each workstation and server
in the DoD.
A hybrid IDS combines one or more of these IDS approaches. [17] While a stand-
alone HIDS has no access to another computer’s internals, some HIDS are configurable
for distributed defense, using information sharing to strengthen the collective defen-
sive posture. A NIDS teamed up with multiple host-based IDS is considered a hybrid
IDS, such as the open source project named Prelude [71].
2.4.2 Signature-based IDS vs Anomaly Detection. There are two main de-
tection methods an IDS employs: signature detection or anomaly detection. Each
method has its pros and cons, which is discussed.
With signature-based IDS, observed data is compared against tersely defined
rules modeled after known malicious activity. An IDS which employs this technique
can only be effective at detecting threats which it has been programmed to detect.
Examples of signature-based IDS methods include state transition modeling [42], and
expert systems which employ string/rule pattern matching [11].
There are a couple of main shortcomings of employing a signature-based IDS.
First, a signature-based IDS is unable to detect novel threats (for which it has not
been programmed), or even variants of known threats [46]. As quickly as a threat
signature is created and deployed, tens or hundreds of threat variants could be created
or unleashed. A signature-based IDS must be constantly updated with the latest
signatures to keep up with the most current threats.
The second shortcoming has to do with the feasibility of searching for known
vulnerabilities in near-real time. The number of known viruses discovered over the
last 20 years, as depicted in Figure 2.3, indicates an exponential growth trend. As of
May 25, 2007, this figure was just over 300,000 [67]. In April 2008, a Computer World
interview with industry experts [27] unveiled that number would surpass 1,000,000
viruses in 2009. While more recent figures are not yet available about how many
viruses exist, this latter projection supports the 20-year trend. The implication this
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Figure 2.3: From 1986-2007, the number of known viruses indicates an exponential
growth trend [67].
29
has to a signature-based solution is that scanning against a signature database will
continue to take longer and longer, to the point of infeasibility in near-real time.
Anomaly detection involves using machine learning to train statistical models,
or classifiers, to recognize malicious or anomalous patterns, or classes, of activity. A
model is composed of a set of distinguishing features within the data which forms a
pattern to be recognized. The recognition of a pattern allows the classifier to properly
categorize data as one class of data or another. Applied to the IDS problem, one needs
to distinguish (at minimum) between normal and a malicious classes. A classifier can
be taught to recognize more specific classes of data as well, e.g. the attack vector, or
the type of normal user activity. Subclasses of this data can be defined with more
specific statistical models. This approach can be effective for detecting novel threats
depending on the strength of the classifier’s underlying model [48].
Anomaly detection algorithms are trained via one of three types of machine
learning: supervised, unsupervised and reinforcement learning. With supervised
learning, an expert provides labeled data to train the classifier directly. With un-
supervised learning, the system learns on its own what is considered normal activity,
and flags everything else as anomalous [11]. Unsupervised learning is considered more
appropriate than supervised learning for traffic classification because it does not rely
on pre-defined classes [16]. Reenforcement learning falls in between supervised and
unsupervised learning. With reinforcement learning, the classifier starts out trying to
figure out on its own what is considered normal activity, but is rewarded or penalized
by an expert for how effective the classifier was. This feedback is fed into the classifier
to enhance refine its model.
Like its signature-based counterpart, anomaly detection is not without faults.
Since statistical models are heuristic measures, and not perfect indicators, they result
in errors in the form of false positives and false negatives [17]. False positives classify
normal activity as malicious activity, which would then typically trigger a manual
review process by an system security expert. False negatives classify malicious activity
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as normal behavior, which would allow an intruder’s activity to go undetected. The
whole anomaly detection game is to train a model which minimizes both types of
errors. There are three additional factors which cause problems for anomaly detection.
First, anomaly detection models are highly experiential. Since an exhaustive
training set is infeasible due to dimensionality, there will be malicious activity the
classifier has never been exposed to. This results in undecidable events which can be
misclassified by the underlying statistical model. Additionally, a model can become
biased if it is “overfit” to noisy data [49]. A model which overfits to a particular class
of data accepts less variance when trying to recognize said class in future data. Stated
another way, data of a particular class which does not closely match the trained model
is more likely to be misclassified as another class of data.
The second challenge with anomaly detection IDS is that malicious activity can
sometimes (intentionally or otherwise) closely resemble normal activity, close enough
that it does not appear anomalous to the classifier. Such is the case with “low and
slow” attacks, which fly below the radar of an IDS, against a computing target. Some
of these activities can be better distinguished by modifying the statistical model;
for example one can change which features comprise the model or add weighting to
features within the model to increase its overall effectiveness.
Third, anomaly detection classifiers may require maintenance similar to its
signature-based counterpart, in the form of periodic (or possibly continuous) re-
training in order to remain effective. The risk, especially with the latter approach, is
that a statistical anomaly-based IDS may unintentionally learn to accept more and
more anomalous activity as normal activity (or vice versa) over time, thereby allowing
a less detectable avenue of access by intruders. Periodic inspection and validation of
a classifier can help avoid classifier creep.
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Figure 2.4: Endsley’s Situational Awareness Model [32].
2.5 Situational Awareness
While other works [31] [61] define situational awareness concepts, the most
pervasive and relevant situational awareness concepts in literature today are proposed
by Dr. Mica Endsley [32]. An overview of Endsley’s conceptual model of situational
awareness, and its applicability to the cyberspace domain, are discussed herein.
2.5.1 Endsley’s Model. The dominating definition of Situational Awareness
(SA) was proposed by Dr. Mica Endsley: “the perception of the elements in an en-
vironment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning
and the projection of their status in the near future” [32]. The process which initi-
ates and refines SA (shown in Figure 2.4) involves sensing the environment, making
decisions, performance of actions, and feedback. While SA does not guarantee good
decisions, it is a precursor for decision making. SA is attained through various sources
of information.
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2.5.1.1 Levels of SA. Coinciding with her definition of SA, Endsley
defines three levels of SA: perception, comprehension and projection [32]. Each level
of SA builds upon the previous.
• Perception is the most basic of the three levels, and is the ability to perceive
domain elements within time and space. Endsley [32] states that “limits in
perception (or attention to percepts) drastically hinder one’s ability to formulate
even the most basic understanding of one’s environment.” Applied to CSA, one
wants to be able to perceive cyber events taking place within the system or
across the network, e.g. “ip 123.123.123.123 is attempting an ARP poisoning
attack against 10.0.0.1.” To build this perception may require data from only
one sensor or data from a combination of two or more sensors. Without the
correct sensors and sensor data, a system will not be able to perceive the event.
• Comprehension builds upon perception; by integrating how people combine,
interpret, store and retain information, comprehension provides “operationally
relevant meaning” [32]. In the above example, suppose IP 10.0.0.1 was an email
server in the internal network. Certainly this knowledge provides a different pic-
ture than if the IP belonged to a web server in ourthe network’s demilitarized
zone (DMZ). If 10.0.0.1 belonged to an email server, it implies that the intruder
has been able to bypass one of the network’s routers, a firewall and perhaps a
proxy server. It implies much deeper penetration than if the server was some
publicly accessible asset. It also implies, perhaps, a much more malicious and
imminent intent to disrupt, deny, or degrade the network’s confidentiality, in-
tegrity or availability. It is important to note that specific domain knowledge
would be required to draw these conclusions. An expansion of domain knowledge
can only help to improve a system’s ability to comprehend the environment.
• Projection is Endsley’s highest form of SA; it is the ability to “anticipate or
forecast future events, allowing for timely decision making” [32]. Continuing
the illustration of the ARP poisoning attack on the email server, given that
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the current state is perceived and comprehended, S.A. would use projection
to anticipate future states. Such an anticipation is necessary for determine
that whoever was at 123.123.123.123 was attempting to disrupt communication
capabilities as the first stage of a larger attack.
2.5.1.2 Attention. Endsley [33] also discusses the impact of working
memory and attention on SA. In human factors, a person can only pay attention to
so many things simultaneously. The same can be said for computers. Due to time,
memory and processing constraints, an SA system cannot always attend to all sensors.
Doing so would cause a system to become non-responsive, a self-imposed denial of
service. Instead one must pick and choose the most operationally relevant sensors to
attend. Distraction comes in the form of overloaded or interrupted processes, or from
attending to sensors or sensor data that does not provide as large of a cost benefit ratio.
Some sensor costs are processing time, processing power, noise and deficient trust
(errors of ommision/commission rates). The benefit is the value of the information,
e.g. its trustworthiness, successful perception rate and importance/relevance of the
data collected.
2.5.2 Cyberspace Situational Awareness (CSA). SA is applicable to every
operational environment (big or small) you can conceive of, and cyberspace is no
exception. Cyberspace Situational Awareness (Cyber SA, or CSA) is the applica-
tion of situational awareness to develop an understanding of the cyberspace domain.
Without some level of CSA, there is no hope of securing networks today and into the
future.
According to [39] [15] [66], CSA can be obtained by gathering and correlating
data simultaneously from multiple sensor inputs. Each sensor’s observations should
be compared against other observations along with a knowledge base, capturing the
relevant details about the event so that it can be analyzed for potential problems, and
reporting this information to a data repository. Today, this analysis is often done by
a human operator, and is typically a reflexive vice proactive act: to determine “what
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just happened” vs “what is about to happen”. There are simply too many places to
look in today’s networks to obtain an accurate and timely site picture; there are too
many sensors and too many moving parts for a human to hunt them all down. Having
a single place to look for sensory output can streamline this process.
Once sensor data outputs such as system audit log entries are gathered into
a central repository, they need to be analyzed for potential threats as quickly as
possible. Without timely situational awareness, cyberspace security professionals will
be unable to adequately protect cyberspace resources. It should be apparent that
automation is a key enabler to attaining enhanced CSA.
2.5.2.1 CSA System Requirements. Okolica, et al. [57] propose a
framework of three overlapping activities are needed to develop an automated Cyber
SA system. First, they propose the system needs to develop a test environment which
provides real, timely, functional, scaled and heterogeneous sensor data that can be
correlated and fused. Second, the Cyber SA system needs to develop language(s),
consisting of cyberspace-relevant vocabulary and grammar, which can describe the
cyber environment at different levels of abstraction. Finally, a Cyber SA system
needs to integrate the adversarial narrative into the abstraction space.
2.5.2.2 NetD COP. An ongoing initiative at Air Force Research Labs
in Rome, NY is the Network Defense Common Operational Picture (NetD COP).
According to [23], the NetD Cop effort demonstrates “enhanced situational awareness
and visualization techniques for network defense”. The system is comprised of an
event correlation engine for cyber attack recognition (ECCARS) and a collection of
visualization tools (VIAssist, VisAlert and FlexViewer). The conclusion from this
demonstration was that the system is capable of providing and enhancing situational
awareness on live network discs [23]. One main piece to the NetD Cop is its Data
Extraction Utility (DEU), a client/server application which parses sensor information
fed to it from firewalls and intrusion detection systems. However, it should be noted
that the sensor inputs to the DEU is already processed (not raw) information, an
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Figure 2.5: AFRL’s NetD COP Decision engines create high-level security alerts
with mission impact assessment from a variety of sensor and data inputs, using a
plug-in architecture [23].
abstraction/classification decision has already been made as to whether or not low
level forensic evidence is suspicious or not. Additionally, NetD COP is focused on
alerts based on network traffic and not on forensic evidence that may be present on
host systems which could indicate attack.
2.5.2.3 SAIL. Another existing architecture is Situational Awareness
Inference and Logic (SAIL). This system architecture proposes to provide higher-
level reasoning than other SA systems [12]. The model provides functionality in three
stages which loosely correlate to Endsley’s SA model. According to the author, all
other known SA systems developed (through publishing in 2009) leave too much of
the situation assessment and projection still with the human observer.
Largely based on formal logic, SAIL provides a controlled natural language
(CNL), designed to reduce ambiguity/vagueness) interface for accepting both data
streams and human inputs for sensor data. Figure 2.6 illustrates the SAIL architec-
ture, and is outlined as follows. Sensor data is collected and aggregated (summarized)
like other SA systems. The aggregate data is then fed to a semantic analysis layer,
which applies descriptive logics to map the data points through an ontology in order
to build a situation assessment. The act portion of Endsley’s SA model is performed
by SAIL’s alerter. As the name implies, the alerter notifies personnel of critical issues
it has reasoned about. (SAIL provides a manual query function as well.)
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Figure 2.6: Baader’s SAIL system architecture [12].
While SAIL may be potentially adapted for use as an IDS reasoner, it has not
been applied to the cyberspace domain. SAIL relies upon a human operator to feed
it relevant features by which it can make inferences about the domain it monitors.
Although SAIL performs data aggregation and semantic analysis from raw data to
build inferences, it not does not use specifically apply CRISP-DM’s process to do so.
2.5.3 JDL Data Fusion Model. Another existing situational awareness
model is JDL’s data fusion model. The JDL’s data fusion model is maintained by
the JDL Data Fusion Group, and is reportedly [65] the most widely-used method for
categorizing data fusion-related functions. The JDL model provides a more bottom-
up data-centric approach than Endsley’s model. The JDL Data Fusion Model defines
five data fusion levels, as depicted in Figure 2.7.
• Level 0 - Sub-Object Data Assessment: estimation and prediction of signal/ob-
ject observable states on the basis of pixel/signal level data association and
characterization;
• Level 1 - Object Assessment: estimation and prediction of entity states on
the basis of observation-to-track association, continuous state estimation (e.g.
kinematics) and discrete state estimation (e.g. target type and ID);
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Figure 2.7: Data Fusion Group’s Joint Data Library data fusion model for situa-
tional awareness [65].
• Level 2 - Situation Assessment: estimation and prediction of relations among
entities, to include force structure and cross force relations, communications and
perceptual influences, physical context, etc.;
• Level 3 - Impact Assessment: estimation and prediction of effects on situa-
tions of planned or estimated/predicted actions by the participants; to include
interactions between action plans of multiple players (e.g. assessing susceptibil-
ities and vulnerabilities to estimated/predicted threat actions given ones own
planned actions);
• Level 4 - Process Refinement (an element of Resource Management): adaptive
data acquisition and processing to support mission objectives.
2.5.4 INFERD. INformation Fusion Engine for Real-time Decision-making
(INFERD) [66] is another context-aware framework which has been applied to the IDS
problem. INFERD utilizes to the JDL model of as a measure of how well it provides
SA. INFERD is, in a nutshell, an alert correlation engine, which does not look at low
level host-based forensic evidence, rather, it relies upon a series of host-based network
sensors to decide between normal and malicious events. Stotz [66] makes no mention
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Figure 2.8: The Cross-Industry Standard Process for Data Mining is a cyclic process
consisting of six phases [21].
of attending to host based sensors which monitor process metadata or internal system
events such as file I/O.
2.6 Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining
The goal of knowledge discovery and data mining (KDD) is to extract patterns
from data. There are a number of professional bodies dedicating to furthering data
mining research, some prominent ones are the Association for Computing Machinery
(ACM) Special Interest Group for Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (SIGKDD)
and the Data Mining Group (DMG). The data mining concept is nothing new, people
have been doing it manually for centuries. However, as problems become more com-
plex and require more data, there is an increased need for digital processing to mine
data. A repeatable data mining process was established by the pioneers of the data
mining movement [21] to provide guidelines for how a data mining process should
flow, and is discussed in the next section.
2.6.1 CRISP-DM. The CRoss Industry Standard Process for Data Min-
ing (CRISP-DM) [21] outlines a six-phase cycle for data mining projects, as shown
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Figure 2.9: Generic tasks of the CRISP-DM Phases. The Data Understanding
phase consists of collecting initial data, describing the data, exploring the data and
verifying data quality [21].
in Figure 2.8. CRISP-DM is intended to be industry-independent, tool-independent
and application-independent. The goal of CRISP-DM is to provide organizations an
understanding of the data mining process and provide a road map to follow while plan-
ning and carrying out a data mining project. The phases are business understanding,
data understanding, data preparation, modeling, evaluation and deployment. The
second phase, data understanding, “starts with initial data collection and proceeds
with activities in order to get familiar with the data, to identify data quality problems,
discover first insights into the data or to detect interesting subsets to form hypotheses
for hidden information” [21]. The hierarchical methodology defines each phase as a
set of generic tasks each consisting of a set of specialized tasks and finally process
instances. The generic tasks which make up data understanding are shown in Figure
2.8.
2.6.2 KDD Platforms. There are plenty of tools available for data min-
ing, ranging from open and free software to enterprise solutions costing hundreds
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of thousands of dollars. A small sampling includes WEKA, RapidMiner, JDM and
MATLAB. First, Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA)is an open
source Java project hosted by the University of Waikato, New Zealand. WEKA pro-
vide a graphical user interface called Explorer, which allows for interactive analysis
of datasets by building workflows, and the ability to build and test computer models.
WEKA has an API allowing for integration into developers’ Java programs as well.
Second and formally known as YALE, RapidMiner boasts more than 400 data
mining operators, and a “huge amount of visualization techniques (http://rapid-
i.com/content/blogcategory/38/69/). While RapidMiner is commercial software, it
offers a community edition and a Java API.
The third KDD platform Java Data Mining API is an effort to divorce the
technology from any particular vendor. However, it is not as mature as WEKA or
Finally, used in many universities and research laboratories, MATLAB (“Ma-
trix Laboratory”) is a commercial product developed in C and Java. MATLAB is
a powerful matrix manipulation tool which can be used for regression and classifica-
tion. MATLAB provides extensions, called toolboxes, allowing for specialized sup-
port. MATLAB’s neural network toolbox is used to test the performance of selected
features.
2.6.3 KDD Algorithms. Data mining algorithms apply machine learning
to extract patterns from observed data. There are three main forms of machine
learning: supervised, unsupervised and reinforcement learning. Each technique has
its pros/cons. The most direct form of machine learning is supervised learning [70].
Supervised learning involves learning a function from examples of its inputs
and outputs. Typically with supervised learning, an expert provides class labels to
each observation in the dataset, and a machine is then trained to recognize each class
based on its labels and prototypical feature values. This process is known also as
classification.
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Figure 2.10: The perceptron is the basic unit of decision within a neural network
[35].
The next form of machine learning is unsupervised learning. Unsupervised learn-
ing involves learning patterns in the input when no specific output values (labels) are
supplied. A machine using this technique attempts to group data to
The final form of machine learning is reinforcement learning. Reinforcement
learning methods are based on iterative feedback which is used to maximize matching.
Effective reinforcement learning techniques balance exploration and exploitation; poor
results are obtained if too much emphasis is placed one one or the other.
2.6.4 Artificial Neural Networks. Also known as multi-layer perceptrons,
there are a number of artificial neural network (ANN) algorithms used for machine
learning, including associative memory, feed forward and back propagation ANN [40].
The simplest form of an ANN algorithm is a single perceptron, as shown in
Figure 2.10 [40]. Perceptrons, and all ANNs for that matter, are biologically inspired
from the way the human brain works. When a perceptron is provided enough “en-
ergy” through weighted inputs to meet the minimum threshold as established by the
sigmoid function (depicted downstream from the summation before arriving at the
next perceptron “y” in Figure 2.10), it “fires”, sending a 1 down the wire to the
next perceptron. Otherwise, it does not fire; it sends a 0 down the wire. Synaptic
weights ω0..n are used to imply relationships between inputs and the perceptron itself;
the higher the weight, the stronger the bond between the input and the perceptron.
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Figure 2.11: An associative memory neural network is an ANN with exactly two
layers of neurons and two connecting layers of weights [35]
.
Weights are usually between 0 and 1, but can be assigned negative values for implying
inverse relationships between an input and the perceptron.
The purpose of an associative memory ANN (Figure 2.11) is, as the name im-
plies, to learn associations [40]. This network consists of two layers: an input layer
and an output layer. The input layer receives weighted inputs from the environment;
each input layer perceptron will either fire to signal each of the output layer percep-
trons or it won’t, again based on the sigmoid function. An associative memory ANN
is iteratively taught to recognize a particular pattern, and once trained, to recall the
pattern even when presented with incomplete or noisy data.
Multi-layer ANNs include one or more “hidden” (intermediate) layers of per-
ceptrons. These networks are capable of learning non-linear relationships, which are
likely to occur in a high-dimensional or complex space. A popular method for training
multilayer perceptrons is through back propagation. With back propagation, a net-
work is trained in two repeated phases: the forward phase and the backward phase.
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Figure 2.12: An ANN consisting of three layers of neurons and two connecting
layers of weights. The middle layer is hidden as it is neither input or output [35].
In the forward phase, the signal is fed from each of the inputs straight through to the
output, without any adjustment of the synaptic weights. In the backward phase, the
output signal is compared to the desired output, and the error is propagated back-
wards through the ANN so that the synaptic weights can be fine-tuned [40]. Together,
the two phases make up a single epoch. Epochs are used to iteratively update the
performance of the neural network until it converges to a minimum mean squared
error.
2.6.5 Analyzing results. There are a number of ways to analyze the expected
performance of a classifier, prominent methods are through generating a performance
plot, a confusion matrix, or a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve.
2.6.5.1 Performance Plot. The performance plot provided by Matlab’s
Neural Network Toolkit [29], displayed in Figure 2.13, visualizes the mean squared
error of the neural network network, which indicates the expected accuracy the net-
work will have when classifying data. Initially, a network starts with a high MSE, but
as the network is trained, the MSE decreases (the network learns). The performance
plot consists of three lines, representing the mean squared error of three subsets of
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Figure 2.13: Example of a performance plot, used to analyze the mean-squared
error of the classifier. A smaller mean-squared error indicates higher performance.
This plot indicates that the best performance (lowest MSE) for the neural network
was attained after nine training epochs.
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Table 2.3: A confusion matrix is used to analyze the overall success rate of a
classifier by accounting for errors of omission and errors of commission.
O
u
tp
u
t
C
la
ss 1 771 (82.2%) 118 (12.7%) 11 (1.2%) 85.7% (14.3%)
2 0 (0.0%) 26 (2.8%) 0 (0.0%) 100% (0.0%)
3 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 5 (0.5%) 100% (0.0%)
100% (0.0%) 18.1% (81.9%) 31.3% (68.8%) 86.1% (13.9%)
1 2 3
Target Class
vectors from within training population provided: training vectors, validation vectors,
and test vectors, in a 60%-20%-20% split respectively. Training continues the network
is memorized or some minimum mean squared error requirement is met, which helps
to avoid overfitting /biasing the classifier to the specific data provided.
A confusion matrix, as shown in Table 2.3, illustrates a classifier’s accuracy
rates by tabulating correct and incorrect results. The 3x3 grid in the upper left of
the matrix indicates for each class, which items were classified correctly into the class
(the light gray cells), and which items were classified incorrectly (the medium gray
cells). Each of the cells (or bins) in this 3x3 grid include two numbers: the raw count
of observations which are in the bin, and its corresponding percentage out of the total
population. The column on the far right indicates, for each output class, the correct
commission rate, along with the error of commission rate in bold. The row at the
bottom indicates, for each target class, overall successful commission rate, along with
errors of omission. In Table 2.3, there were 118 mislabeled “Class 2” observations,
which contributed to output class 1’s 14.3% error of commission rate, and to the
target ”class 2” 81.9% error of omission rate.
The target class is the true label of the data, whereas the output class is what
the classifier labeled the data. The right column and bottom row hold summary data
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Figure 2.14: Example of a ROC curve, used to analyze a classifier’s specificity
versus its sensitivity [29].
from the 3x3 grid, and the bottom right corner presents the overall accuracy of the
classifier. In this case, the classifier is expected to correctly identify 86.1% of future
observations, assuming the data which trained the network was not biased.
2.6.5.2 ROC Curves. The Receiver Operating Characteristic curve
(ROC) plot [29], illustrated in Figure 2.14 is a visualization of a classifier’s true
positive ratio (correct classification rate) charted against its false positive ratio (errors
of commission). A ROC curve demonstrates the tradeoff between how sensitive a
network is and how fully specified it is. A more accurate ROC curve more tightly fits
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against the left and top edges of the chart; a less accurate test is indicated by a curve
which approaches the 45 degree line of the chart.
2.7 Data Sources
Due to privacy concerns, and to allow for comparable results, many researchers
use test data sets rather than using real, operational data. There are two main data
sets researchers in intrusion detection use, as well as test environments for those who
want to generate new data sets for their experiments.
2.8 Research Data Sets
Much of intrusion detection research community relies heavily upon comparing
results based on datasets from two research groups. Both data sets are network packet
captures taken during periods of normal activity and network attacks.
The first dataset was a set of tcpdump files created in 1998 (additional iterations
were created in 1999 and 2000) by a partnership between Massachusetts Institute of
Technology’s (MIT Lincoln Laboratory and the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency DARPA), called the “MIT/DARPA Intrusion Detection System Evaluation
datasets” or simply MIT/DARPA datasets. Both the MIT/DARPA 1998 and MIT/-
DARPA 1999 data sets have since been criticized for poor methodologies which biased
results [54], so much so that calls have gone out for researchers to stop using them as
benchmarks for IDS research [19].
The second widely-used IDS datasets were benchmarked by the KDD Cup in
1999. Unfortunately, as this data is an extracted subset of the MIT/DARPA ’98; it
faces the same scrutiny and pitfalls [18].
Because existing datasets do not provide host-based sensor data, and the desire
to have event-correlated network and host sensor data, a separate data set will need
to be generated to support the research performed for this thesis.
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2.9 Summary
A literature review of many facets related to this thesis research includes the
study of intrusion detection systems and techniques, situational awareness and its
applicability to the cyberspace domain, along with knowledge discovery and neural
network methodologies. Upon a literature review of leading intrusion detection ef-
forts, it appears that a multi-sensor study of a system under attack has not been
attempted or documented for the purpose of performing host-based forensic feature
selection. This thesis applies knowledge discovery techniques specified by CRISP-DM
to identify relevant intrusion detection features, and validates these results by testing
and analyzing the performance of these features with an artificial neural network.
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III. Methodology
In order to identify the forensic data which best indicates various stages of an attack
on a host, a series of controlled data collections are performed. The data is then
explored and analyzed for consistency and usability for identifying an event from the
collection via the CRISP-DM process illustrated in Figure 3.1. Selected features are
used to build a neural network to test the performance of the selected items.
This chapter outlines the research methodology used to study the ability of com-
bining behavior-based classifiers for detecting network attacks. First, is a description
of the data collection environment, followed by a explanation of how CRISP-DM’s
data understanding, preparation, modeling and evaluation steps are used to analyze
the forensic features for their relevance in detecting malicious host activity. Results
of this process are presented in Chapter four.
3.1 CRISP-DM: Data Understanding
The data collection environment, the “Cyberspace Situational Awareness Labo-
ratory” (CSA Lab), consists of a “black hat” computer and a “target” machine hosted
on a wireless network, as depicted in Figure 3.2. The target machine is a Windows
XP-based virtual machine which is outfitted with a selection of live forensic data
capture tools. The black hat machine is a Windows XP system (not a virtual ma-
chine), outfitted with a selection of well known scanning and exploit programs. Both
machines are Dell Latitude
TM
D630 laptops: a 64-bit hardware architecture with an
Intel R© CoreTM 2 Duo processor, 8GB of RAM, a 120GB hard drive and a wireless
network interface card (NIC). The host network provides all routing, domain name
resolution and Internet access. A specification of the relevant hardware and software
used is listed within this section.
3.1.1 Black Hat Client. The black hat machine is a workstation outfitted
with a number of cyber attack tools. During data collections, the black hat client
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Figure 3.1: Data Understanding is one of the key phases of the CRISP-DM Process
Model [21].
Figure 3.2: The CSA Lab environment is comprised of two machines connected to
a wireless network, with Internet connectivity provided by the host network.
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Table 3.1: The relevant software configuration for the black hat machine includes
a number of well-known scanning and exploit tools.
Machine Name BLACKHAT
Host Operating System Windows XP Service Pack 2
Applications Microsoft Office 2007 Professional, Mi-
crosoft Internet Explorer 7.0
Scanning & Exploit Tools
ping: Included with MS Windows XP, SP2
fping v2.2: www.kwakkelflap.com
ws ping v2.30: www.ipswitch.com
Zenmap v4.76: www.nmap.org
Nessus v4: www.nessus.org
DumpSec v2.8.6: www.systemtools.com
ShareEnum v1.6: www.sysinternals.com
MetaSploit v3: www.metasploit.com
PWDump v2.0.0-beta-2: www.foofus.net
FGDump v2.1.0: www.foofus.net
RegBack: www.microsoft.com
BO2K v1.1: www.bo2k.com
runs “cyber attack” scenarios as described in Section 3.1.2 and detailed in Appendix
C. The configuration of the black hat client is shown in Table 3.1.
3.1.1.1 Target Machine. The machine which performs the data col-
lections (referred to as the “target”) is a virtual machine instance of Windows XP,
Service Pack 2, running on top of a 64-bit Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise host op-
erating system. VMWare Workstation 6.05 build-109488 provides the virtualization
support, which provides the capability of create an image of the machine’s state, as
well as the ability to quickly restore the machine’s state to the same baseline between
data collections quickly.
The target is outfitted with live forensic tools which monitor network, process
and file activity. During experiments, the target runs through scripted “Normal user”
activity scenarios as specified in Appendix B. Additionally, the target is subjected to
attack activity, using the scenarios as specified in Appendix C. Table 3.2 outlines the
software installed on the target.
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Table 3.2: Configuration of the “target” machine. Sensors are annotated as either
transactional (t) or snapshot (s) sensors, as explained in Section 3.1.2.
VM Name TARGET
VM Configuration 2GHz Intel Core 2 Duo CPU, 2GB RAM, 30GB hard
drive, bridged ethernet adapter
Guest OS Windows XP Service Pack 2
Applications Microsoft Office 2007 Professional, Microsoft Internet
Explorer 7.0
Sensors
[t] logman.exe v5.1.2600.2180: Included with MS
Windows XP, SP2
[t] tshark.exe v1.2.4: Included with Wireshark
v1.2.4 [4]
[s] listdlls.exe v2.25: www.sysinternals.com [59]
[s] logonsession.exe v1.1: www.sysinternals.com
[59]
[s] pslist.exe v1.28: www.sysinternals.com [59]
[s] tcpvcon.exe v2.54: www.sysinternals.com [59]
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3.1.2 Sensors. To capture forensic evidence on the fly, two types of sensors
are used: transactional sensors and snapshot sensors. As the name implies, trans-
actional sensors capture each transaction within the sensor’s purview. Transactional
sensors, once started, continue capturing data until they are halted, or until some
user-defined rule is met (such as time limit or file size thresholds). An example of
this type of sensors is tshark.exe [4], used to monitor a network device for inbound
and outbound network packets. Snapshot sensors capture, and provide raw and/or
summary data about a portion of the current system state or configuration. An ex-
ample of a snapshot sensor is SysInternal’s pslist.exe [59], which displays a snapshot
of process memory and processor utilization. System events which start and stop
between snapshots may yield no forensic evidence to a snapshot sensor of any sort.
Collection is performed in three stages: normal, scanning, and exploit collec-
tions. This helps to keep collection sizes manageable, and to provide distinct datasets
based on the purpose for the collection. The first steps to each collection involves en-
suring the target machine is set to its baseline configuration by loading a previously
established VM snapshot through the VMWare software, and launching the sensor
scripts. To launch sensors for each experiment in a repeatable and consistent manner,
Windows Script Host (WSH version 5.6), paired with DOS batch programming, is
used. A source code listing and a brief explanation of the sensor scripts are listed in
Appendix A.
The purpose of the normal collection is to generate a set of data which consists
only of typical user activity, devoid of scanning or other malicious activity. The
normal collection only involves performing actions on the target machine. During
this collection, summarized in Appendix B, the target machine runs through a series
of scenarios such as using Microsoft Office products, Internet Explorer and sending
and receiving email. The data set generated is used to provide a baseline forensic
data set to compare with the scanning and exploit collections.
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The purpose of the scanning collection is is to generate a set of data which
consists of scanning and service enumeration events. The scanning collection involves
both machines, but the bulk of the activity is performed by the black hat machine.
As with other collections, the target machine launches the forensic sensors to start
the collection process. Then the black hat machine is used to run through a series
of scanning enumeration activities against the target machine, such as using ping,
Nessus and Nmap. The data set generated is used to provide a better understanding
of forensic evidence generated by a scanning event versus normal activity.
The purpose of the exploit collection is is to generate a set of data which con-
sists of attempts to gain access, elevate privileges, plant back doors and to cover
tracks. The scanning collection involves both machines, but the bulk of the activity
is performed by the black hat machine. As with other collections, the target machine
launches the forensic sensors to start the collection process. The black hat machine
is used to run through a series of exploit activities against the target machine, such
as using Metasploit to launch various exploit payloads at the target machine, using
regback, pwdump and fgdump, and other tools to exfiltrate data, and using back
orafice to launch a keylogger. The data set generated is used to provide a better
understanding of forensic evidence generated by a various exploitation stages within
an attack sequence.
Each dataset consists of outputs from the six sensors listed in Section 3.1.1.1,
with potentially thousands of files to parse through. Each tool generates specific
forensic data features. Each feature generated is initially considered a candidate for
providing separation between normal and malicious activity, in order to identify as
many effective features as possible.
Process Overview Sensor. In order to capture summary process
data, such as memory utilization, user and system time, number of threads and han-
dles, SysInternals’ pslist.exe (version 1.28) [59] program is used. Running this tool
from the command line with the −x parameter provides process ID, process name,
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user and kernel time, counts of threads, handles, context switches and various mem-
ory statistics. This tool is categorized as a snapshot sensor. By adding −s − r2
parameters, a snapshot is obtained every two seconds; this data is streamed directly
to an output file from the console. While pslist.exe is present in digital forensics
research [9] [10] [68], no literature has presented itself which persists tool outputs to
a central data repository in order to farm for features to use in classification. Each
feature produced by the tool is therefore considered a candidate feature for identifying
malicious activity.
Table 3.3: “Process Overview” sensor features which are
evaluated for effectiveness in distinguishing between nor-
mal and attack events.
“Process Overview” Sensor Features evaluated
Field Name Description
priority Lowest priority thread for PID
threadCount Count of thread for PID
handleCount # File handles for PID
cpuTime CPU time for process
workingSet Working set memory used by process
vMem Virtual Memory (VM) for PID
privateVMem Private VM used by PID
privateVMemPeak Private VM Peak for PID
faults Page Faults encountered by PID
nonpagedPool Nonpaged Pool cache size
pagedPool Paged Pool cache size
∆ priority Since previously polled
∆ threadCount Since previously polled
∆ handleCount Since previously polled
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 3.3 – Continued
Field Name Description
∆ cpuTime Since previously polled
∆ workingSet Since previously polled
∆ vMem Since previously polled
∆ privateVMem Since previously polled
∆ privateVMemPeak Since previously polled
∆ faults Since previously polled
∆ nonpagedPool Since previously polled
∆ pagedPool Since previously polled
Network Packet Sensor. To capture network packets being sent to
and from the host system, the console version of WireShark, tShark.exe (version 1.2.4)
[4] is used. TShark was chosen over its GUI (GUI) counterpart (wireshark.exe), due
to the fact that it provides the same data with a lighter impact to system resources.
This tool is categorized as a transactional sensor.
Since the aim is to identify host-based intrusion detection-relevant forensic data,
only packets destined for the target machine - packets sent specifically to the host
machine plus broadcasts to the machine’s subnet - are monitored. The protocols
specifically evaluated are TCP, UDP, ICMP, ARP traffic. Relevant fields captured
include, but are not limited to those listed in Table 3.4. There are a number of
digital forensics research efforts which utilize packet capture files [38] [36] [46]. The
features and methodologies vary from signature detection to anomaly detection, but
Haag [38] and Gonzalez [36] both focus on the elements found within protocol headers
and packet-level metrics, which is where this research effort spends some of its focus
with regard to network traffic features. Additionally, this research looks at volumetric
data such as number of bytes sent/received per protocol.
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Table 3.4: Some of the “Network packet sensor” features
which are evaluated for effectiveness in distinguishing be-
tween normal and attack events.
“Network Packet Sensor” Features evaluated
Field Name Description
Inter-Arrival Time Average Time between packets
Window Size Average From TCP header
Payload Size Average in bytes
# Protocol Packets Count packets by protocol
# Local Ports Count distinct ports with communication
# Packets Count count of packets
# Flags Counts TCP Flags, UDP/ICMP/ARP
Codes
Process Dlls Sensor. To help with the mapping of processes,
and which dynamic-linked libraries (DLL)they are associated with, SysInternals’ list-
dlls.exe (version 2.25) [59] program is used. This tool is categorized as a snapshot
sensor. While listdlls.exe is present in digital forensics research [68], no literature has
presented itself which persists tool outputs to a central data repository in order to
farm for features to use in classification. Features in Table 3.5 were selected based on
intuition that they may prove good indicators for identifying malicious activity. Fea-
tures related “abnormal dll” rely upon comparisons with a baseline “normal” activity
capture.
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Table 3.5: “Process Dlls” sensor features which are eval-
uated for effectiveness in distinguishing between normal
and attack events.
“Process Dlls Sensor” Features evaluated
Field Name Description
#DLLs Count of DLLs loaded
∆ DLL Count Count difference since last polled
Checksum changed Boolean, change detected since last polled
Abnormal DLL Count Based on normal activity
Abnormal DLL Count Delta Based on normal activity
Process to Ports Sensor. To help with the mapping of data
between network captures and event trace logs, SysInternals’ tcpvcon.exe (version
2.54) [59] program is used. This command line tool provides a listing of ports and their
associated processes. This tool is categorized as a snapshot sensor. While tcpvcon.exe
is present in digital forensics research [20] [10], no literature has presented itself which
persists tool outputs to a central data repository in order to farm for features to use
in classification. Features were selected based on a suspicion that they may be good
indicators for identifying malicious activity. Features related “abnormal port” rely
upon comparisons with a baseline “normal” activity capture. Table 3.6 lists features
evaluated for effectiveness in distinguishing between normal and attack events.
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Table 3.6: “Process to Ports” sensor features which are
evaluated for effectiveness in distinguishing between nor-
mal and attack events.
“Process to Ports” Sensor Features evaluated
Field Name Description
Local Port Local port associated with PID
Protocol Local port associated with PID
Remote Port Local port associated with PID
Local Addr is FQDN Boolean, Local address specified as work-
group.machine
Local Port Recognized Based on Windows XP services file
Remote Port Recognized Based on Windows XP services file
Remote Addr is Self Remote address is self
State Boolean sparse matrix: Close wait, estab-
lished, listening
State Changed State changed since last polled
Abnormal Port for Process Boolean, based on normal activity
Process to Session Sensor. To capture who is logged on at
a point in time and what processes a user “owns”, SysInternals’ logonsessions.exe
(version 1.1) [59] program is used. This tool is categorized as a snapshot sensor.
While logonsessions.exe is present in digital forensics research [50], no literature has
presented itself which persists tool outputs to a central data repository in order to
farm for features to use in classification. Features were selected based on a suspicion
that they may be good indicators for identifying malicious activity. Features related
“abnormal port” rely upon comparisons with a baseline “normal” activity capture.
Table 3.7 lists features evaluated for effectiveness in distinguishing between normal
and attack events.
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Table 3.7: “Process to session” features which are eval-
uated for effectiveness in distinguishing between normal
and attack events.
“Process to session” Features evaluated
Field Name Description
# Processes Number of processes tied to session
∆ # Processes Change since last polled
Logon Type Boolean Sparse Matrix: Interactive, service,
etc
Authentication Package Boolean Sparse Matrix: NTLM, negotiate
Account Type Boolean Sparse Matrix: System, local,
anonymous, etc
Event Trace for Windows Sensor. In order to capture events
each process handles during experiments, Event Trace for Windows (ETW) is used to
generate event trace log (ETL) files. This transactional sensor can be configured via
Performance Monitor, using the default system provider as shown in Figure 3.3. To
start and halt a tracelog capture, the logman.exe (version 5.1.2600.2180) command
line utility which ships with the Windows XP operating system is used. While event
trace for windows is present in digital forensics research [14], which had shown some
promise for use in anomaly detection, but no discussion of feature analysis was men-
tioned. No other literature presents itself which persists tool outputs to a central data
repository in order to farm for features to use in classification. Features were selected
based on a suspicion that they may be good indicators for identifying malicious ac-
tivity. Table 3.7 lists features evaluated for effectiveness in distinguishing between
normal and attack events.
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Figure 3.3: Use Performance Monitor to configure the event trace capture. For
captures, the default system provider is used with all capture options selected.
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Relevant fields captured from the event trace sensor include, but are not limited
to those listed in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8: Event Trace for Windows features which are
evaluated for effectiveness in distinguishing between nor-
mal and attack events.
Event Trace for Windows Features evaluated
Field Name Description
# Operations Count of events
# Event IAT Avg Event Inter Arrival Time
Tot User Time(ms) Sum User time (in milliseconds)
Tot Kernel Time(ms) Sum Kernel time (in milliseconds)
# threads at work Count Unique threads performing operations
# Bytes In Sum Bytes Received (TCP/UDP Events)
# Bytes Out Sum Bytes Sent (TCP/UDP Events)
# Disk IO Read Count of events
# Disk IO Write Count of events
# File IO Create Count of events
# File IO Name Count of events
# Page Fault CopyOnWrite Count of events
# Page Fault DemandZeroFault Count of events
# Page Fault HardPageFault Count of events
# Page Fault TransitionFault Count of events
# Process End Count of events
# Process Start Count of events
# TcpIp Disconnect Count of events
# TcpIp Reconnect Count of events
# TcpIp Retransmit Count of events
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 3.8 – Continued
Field Name Description
# TcpIp Send Count of events
# TcpIp Recv Count of events
# TcpIp end Count of events
# Thread End Count of events
# Thread Start Count of events
# Thread End Count of events
# Thread End Count of events
# Thread End Count of events
# UdpIp Send Count of events
# UdpIp Recv Count of events
# Other Event Count of events not listed above
Abnormal Ports accessed Based on “Normal” data capture
Abnormal Files accessed Based on “Normal” data capture
3.1.3 Sensor View of System. In Figure 3.4, an abstract view of the foren-
sic segments of a Windows XP Workstation, and the coverage of these segments by
the sensors selected is shown. First, the diagram reflects that TShark.exe monitors
network activity. Then, pslist.exe and listdlls.exe provide meta data about running
processes and their associated dlls. Next, ETW provides events pertaining to file and
registry accesses (among other things). Additionally, PSloglist provides the capability
to export system, security and application logs. LogonSessions.exe provides infor-
mation pertaining to active sessions and the processes associated to them. Finally,
TCPVCon provides a way to relate port activity with process information gathered.
This coverage is desired in order to cast a wide net around potential features which
may indicate malicious activity.
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Figure 3.4: Forensic segments of a Windows XP workstation, and the sensors which
can monitor them.
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3.2 CRISP-DM: Preparation
To describe and explain the data, a framework for parsing the sensor data in a
consistent and repeatable way is developed in Java. Since each sensor’s output is spe-
cific, a distinct parser exists for each sensor. Parsing data from the selected snapshot
sensors is relatively straightforward, as the outputs are already in human-readable
form (text). Each of these sensors produces structured output which can be parsed
in a consistent manner. However, each of the selected transactional parsers generate
binary files (ETL and PCAP files), which need to be parsed with the assistance of
some other means before they can be read. Tracerpt.exe is used to translate ETL
data from its raw form to text before attempting to parse and analyze the data. To
parse the network packet data captured by tshark.exe, an open source Java SDK
called jNetPcap [3] is used. jNetPcap is a Libpcap/WinPcap wrapper, so it is capable
of parsing data produced by any packet capturing application which is built upon
Libpcap/WinPcap, such as WireShark and tshark. The jNetPcap API is included in
the parsing framework specifically for this purpose.
As mentioned previously, sensors are classified as either transactional or as snap-
shot sensors. A transactional sensor class was developed for each of the transactional
sensors, which include summarizing methods in addition to the above listed methods.
3.2.0.1 Snapshot Parsers. Each transactional parser implements the
I SnapshotParser interface in Java shown below; each class implementing this interface
must provide the capabilities listed here. Parameterized templates are used, denoted
by T in the source code listing below; an implementing class must provide these
methods, plugging in its own class name in place of the T operator. This method
provides for extensibility for plugging in additional sensors to the framework later on.
package model.parser;
import java.io.File;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import model.ForensicDate;
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public abstract interface I_SnapshotParser<T>
{
public abstract ArrayList<T> parse(File f);
public abstract ArrayList<T> getObsByFTW(ArrayList<T> arr, ForensicDate ftw);
public abstract void exportToCSV(ArrayList<T> arr, String s);
public abstract ArrayList<T> fillGaps(ArrayList<T> arr);
public abstract String getCSVHeaders();
public abstract String toCSV();
}
3.2.0.2 Transactional Parsers. Each transactional parser implements
the I TransactionalParser interface in Java shown below; each class implementing this
interface must provide the capabilities listed here. Parameterized templates are used,
denoted by T in the source code listing below; this delegates the class to implement
a class-specific function, plugging in their own class name in place of the T operator.
package model.parser;
import java.io.File;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import model.ForensicDate;
public abstract interface I_TransactionalParser<T>
{
public abstract ArrayList<T> parse(File f);
public abstract ArrayList<T> filterByFTW(ArrayList<T> arr, ForensicDate ftw);
public abstract void exportToCSV(ArrayList<T> arr, String s);
public abstract String getCSVHeaders();
public abstract String toCSV();
public abstract T summarize(ArrayList<T> arr);
public abstract ArrayList<T> buildExemplars(ArrayList<T> arr);
}
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3.2.1 Data Alignment. In order to build a forensically diverse observation
which includes data from all the sensors, a search of related features is required. Recall
from Figure 3.4, the forensic coverage of the selected sensors has a little overlap;
overlapping features are used to relate sensors from two or more sensors together as a
single combined observation. Three elements are used to align data between sensors:
Process ID, Local Port and Forensic Time Window.
Process ID. Each selected sensor, with the exception of the
network packet capturing sensor, includes process id (PID) in their outputs. Unfor-
tunately, four of these sensors capture snapshots only, and are unable to see processes
which start and end between snapshots. Luckily, ETW captures process start and
stop activity, as well as which executable file the process id is associated with; this
information is used to partially fill forensic data gaps between snapshots. Because the
Process ID is assigned at run time by the operating system, and is not guaranteed to
map to an executable between captures, a standard process id (SPID) field is created.
The SPID is an integer assigned to a specific executable which is observed in at least
one of the captures, and becomes the key by which data is normalized later in the
process.
Local Port. Tying network data provided by tshark to the process
data is a bit of a challenge. Although tcpvcon.exe provides PIDs and their associated
ports, it is a snapshot sensor, and subject to the same problem as other snapshot
sensors. Fortunately, ETW once again provides a means to fill in some of the forensic
data gaps between snapshots. FTW captures summary information about UDP and
TCP events (by PID); this information is used to identify traffic which occurs between
snapshots.
Forensic Time Window. Another data alignment consideration
is timing. Because snapshot sensors are executed one after another, there are dis-
crepancies in the collection times for the “current” snapshot of a process. This is
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addressed using forensic time windows (FTW), two-second time frames by which a
process’ or port’s activity can be summarized. Shilland [62] takes this approach to
account for variations in code speed on a MANET (MANET) IDS. Since collections
are performed on one machine using a single computer’s clock to track time, it is as-
sumed time synchronization issues which arise from distributed systems [45] are not
an issue.
3.2.2 Feature Selection. In order to perform some of the analysis, the
parsed data is stored in a Microsoft SQL Server 2008 Server, Express edition. Data
is uploaded en mass for labeling, normalization and for performing feature analysis.
Data is initially affixed with two labels per observation en mass according to its
temporal proximity to a known event within a scenario. The first label is a category
label, which is either “normal”, “scanning” or “attack.” The second label is an attack
stage label, which is either “normal” or the generic name for an attack stage such as
“planting back door” or “privilege escalation”. Although it is known what activity
takes place at a particular time t, it is unknown what low level impacts the activity
has on other processes, such as causal relationships and interprocess communication.
Therefore, all evidence collected at the time stamp is labeled similarly.
Once collected and labeled, the data understanding portion of the research be-
gins. Again, the goal of refining data understanding is to selectively determine features
from data collections which may help to distinguish malicious activity from normal
activity. Because malicious activity comes in many forms, an attempt to correlate
each feature to specific types of malicious activity: scanning, enumerating, gaining
access is performed. And, because the intent is to pass these features over to a neural
network for classification, a feature does not need to singularly and deterministically
identify the class. However, a relevant feature is one which should generally provide
some separation between classes.
With this in mind, features are identified using one of two methods: “Set dis-
tinction” and “Abnormal measures.”
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3.2.2.1 Set Distinction. The first method for identifying features is
through set distinction. Datasets of distinct values occurring within a candidate
feature are built using Transact SQL (T-SQL); one set is generated for each class of
data to classify. From this, more T-SQL statements are executed to identify which
values only occur in one collection or another. Results from this process are then
manually examined to determine if the presence of a particular value is a matter of
coincidence (actually part of normal operations) or appears correlated to a specific
event or set of events. Items which appear correlated to a specific event are researched
in literature to determine if the value has significant meaning to the event. From this,
a decision is made to include the discovery of this value as a feature for HIDS or not.
3.2.2.2 Abnormal Measures. For features which rely on measures (e.g.,
counts of event x or ∆ measures ), an analysis of the distribution of the datapoints
is performed. To do this, sample statistics are taken for each observed variable,
namely its mean x¯ as shown in Equation 3.1, sample standard deviation s as shown
in Equation 3.2, skewness skew as shown in Equation 3.3 and kurtosis kurt as shown
in Equation 3.4. These measures will help us to determine each variable’s potential
value toward separating classes of data.
The sample mean, x¯, provides an average of all values within the sample, and
is given as:
x¯ =
n∑
i=1
xi
n
(3.1)
Standard deviation, s, is a measure of the average difference between each data
point and x¯, and is given as:
s =
√∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2
n− 1 (3.2)
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Skewness describes the level of asymmetry of the distribution of a random vari-
able with regard to its mean. Positive skewness indicates a distribution with an
asymmetric tail extending toward more positive values. Negative skewness indicates
a distribution with an asymmetric tail extending toward more negative values. The
formula for the skewness consists of sum of the deviations from the mean divided by
standard deviation on the third degree.
skew = n/(
n− 1
n− 2) ∗
n∑
i=1
(
xi − x¯
s
)3 (3.3)
Kurtosis characterizes how flat or noisy a distribution is when compared to the
normal distribution. Positive kurtosis indicates a peaked distribution, while negative
kurtosis indicates flatter distribution. Kurtosis is the sum of the deviations from the
mean divided by standard deviation to the fourth power.
kurt =
1
n
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)4
1
n
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2
− 3 (3.4)
Upon completion of the attack sequence, forensic data is aggregated from each
sensor on the Sensor client into two-second time intervals, grouped by key fields such
as process id or local port number. Each time interval is assigned an ID which
corresponds with the start date and time of the interval. Each record in the time
interval is grouped by its key fields, and the remaining fields of interest are summarized
via aggregation functions (averages, summations, deltas, mean, standard deviation
and kurtosis) as they relate to the key fields.
3.2.3 Signature-Based Feature Identification. The first method used to
generate features is performed by identifying the presence or absence of suspicious
signatures within the forensic data. This method is implemented on variables which
have no numerical measurement, e.g. string-based variables whose literal value has
meaning in its own right.
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From each class of labeled data to identify (e.g., ’normal’, ’scanning’, ’exploit’),
a set of unique observations is built. Items which only occur within a single class,
or occur relatively infrequently in other classes, become candidate class signatures.
For each candidate class signature, a mechanism next interprets the relevance of
the item’s meaning with regard to the temporality of the observation within the
dataset in question. The researcher evaluates each candidate signature independently
to identify what data and/or capabilities the file provides, and the inferred meaning
of accessing the file at time t. Additionally, the human operator compares instances
of the signature detected against collections to determine if the item is a coincidental
instance or correlated instance to the activity at the given point in time. Finally, if
an item is deemed relevant to the class of data to identify, it is added as a feature to
look for within future collections. Validation of these features includes attempts to
produce the signature in a data collection through the performance of valid actions.
3.3 CRISP-DM: Modeling and Analysis
An artificial neural network (ANN) is used to model the data set of selected
features. Each observation is formatted appropriately for use with the MATLAB
Neural Network Toolbox, to include the observation’s true classification label and a
vector of the selected features. The input data is split into two groups, populated
via monte carlo sampling [58]: two-thirds for training and one-third for testing. The
ANN is trained via back propagation using varying training parameters:
• Learn Rate: vary from 0.01 to 0.2
• Activation Function: vary between tansig, logsig [29]
• Number of Hidden Layers: vary from 1 to 3
• Number of Neurons in Hidden Layers: vary from 3 to 30
• Target Accuracy Rate (MSE): 0.0001
• Maximum Epochs: 1,000
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Once the ANN training phase is completed, the ANN is used to classify the
testing data set. A ROC Curve Plot and a confusion matrix are both used to interpret
the classification accuracy of the ANN model.
3.4 Summary
A research methodology is now laid out by which to study the feasibility of
behavior-based classifiers for network attacks. An understanding of research goals and
hypothesis, a description of the development and test environments, and a description
of the experiments along with assumptions and limitations, is critical for anyone
intending to duplicate or continue this research. The results of the experiments can
be found in Chapter four.
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IV. Results & Analysis
The data collections were performed in three phases, and produced three datasets:
Normal, Scanning and Exploit. Table 4.1 provides a summary of these collections in
terms of execution time, number of files generated and cumulative raw data size.
4.1 Signatures Discovered
Collection analysis identified seven specific items that correlated well with the
events occurring at the time and provided discrimination between normal and attack.
Each feature was discovered independently by performing data discovery activities on
the data, querying data for correlation between events and observations within the
data. Six of the seven features are attributed to File IO activity, the seventh is a
measure of port activity. Admittedly, a few of these features may not perform well in
environments which differ wildly from the environment used in this research.
1. High count of local ports with activity. In general, 20 or more distinct active
ports indicated the presence of port scanning activity within the data collected.
This feature is a volumetric measure against normal activity, which peaked at
25 active ports while in normal stage [17], web surfing. The threshold can be
set higher, but at the risk of producing more false negatives within the data.
Additionally, it is completely feasible to be scanned via low and slow scanners,
which would not report above the threshold established. This is a problem
which plagues many anomaly detection systems. Lower level protocol analysis
would be required to more definitively identify scanning activity as a signature,
Table 4.1: Summary of Collection times, number of files and the amount of raw data
generated. Collection times are intended to simulate a long period of probing followed
by a direct and quick set of exploits which take advantage of learned vulnerabilities.
Collection Minutes Files Raw Data Size
Normal 41 mins 2803 1.18 GB
Scanning 40 mins 2561 904 MB
Exploit 9 mins 244 131 MB
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but signatures of activity are not without error. As shown in the collection, a
high incident of false positives resulted from protocol analysis using signatures.
2. File IO activity involving a /mailslot/. Mailslots [60] support unreliable unidi-
rectional data transmission, and support the capability to receive broadcasts;
however, a valid application for /mailslot/ activity is time synchronization. The
collections performed did not include a time server, so results may be biased for
this reason. Only four events across all collections yielded /mailslot/ activity,
two events had four counts of this activity and four events were attributed to
times when the attacker was using a remote connection to execute commands
on the target machine. Two events had one count of this activity, which is tied
to a specific tool, covered next.
3. File IO activity involving /mailslot/Nessus. Two events related to Nessus vul-
nerability scanning involved this activity. As mentioned previously, mailslots
provide a way for receiving broadcasts. Nessus may use mailslot broadcasts
when looking for vulnerabilities across a number of machines on the same net-
work or subnet.
4. File IO activity involving /mup/. Multiple Universal Naming Convention (UNC)
Providers (MUP) [60] are device drivers which field input/output requests to
files or devices that are exposed to the network via UNC. 23 instances of MUP
signatures occur across seven events from the attack collection, and nowhere else
in any other collection. Valid MUP usage include accessing a shared directory
on the target system. However, since the test operates under the assumption
that UNC shares are disallowed by policy on a workstation, MUP should not
be seen through normal usage.
5. File IO activity involving net.exe Net.exe and net1.exe each provide networking
services via the command line. However, more than two-thirds of all net.exe
and net1.exe calls made happened during two events in the capture, one where
metasploit’s adduser payload was launched at the target, the other when an
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attack script created a network drive connection back to the attackers machine.
This feature obviously cannot be used by itself, as there are a number of valid
user situations where net.exe may be used; an alert based solely on this would,
over time, result in a high incidence of false positives.
6. Authentication File Dump Feature This is a composite condition, where one
of the following was noted in File IO activity: regback, lsadump, cachedump,
fgdump-log. Presence of each of these strings was related to at least one of the
attempts to exfiltrate passwords, but is tied to specific tools. System adminis-
trators may have reasons for wanting to run these utilities, but the typical user
should not be running these applications.
7. Remote as System feature This string is the most interesting of them all, it in-
volves an embedded string encoding of the System account’s session id (which
is hard-coded into the operating system as decimal 999, or 0x3e7). A typical
string that would trigger the remote as system feature is:
“\Device\LanmanRedirector\;P:00000000000003e7\blackhat\shareddocs\exploit\”
Originally, the feature selected was:
“\device\lanmanredirector.”
However, this proved a poor performer, since a valid user with a session on the
machine can trigger that rule by accessing any of their connected drives. In
fact, the user’s session id would be present where the system session id is in the
sample string above. The correlation between this string and events at the time
indicate that its presence signifies remote access to the machine with System
credentials.
4.2 Neural Network Results
The seven features identified within the data were used to train a neural network
using back propagation. Data was split into two groups, populated via monte carlo
sampling [58]: two-thirds for training and one-third for testing. The training data
was used to train the neural network with learn rates ranging from 0.1% to 2%,
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Table 4.2: Upon simulating the trained network against unbiased test data, results
show the the features selected perform very well to identify normal and malicious
activity.
O
u
tp
u
t
C
la
ss Normal 885 (95.1%) 2 (0.2%) 0 (0.0%) 99.8% (0.2%)
Scanning 0 (0.0%) 32 (3.4%) 0 (0.0%) 100% (0.0%)
Exploit 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 12 (1.3%) 100% (0.0%)
100% (0.0%) 94.1% (5.9%) 100.0% (0.0%) 99.8% (0.2%)
Normal Scanning Exploit
Target Class
and with various activation functions (e.g., tangent sigmoid or log sigmoid activation
functions [29]), a limit of training 1000 epochs, and a MSE goal of 10−4. Seven input
neurons made up the input layer, corresponding to the seven features. Three output
neurons made up the output layer, corresponding to the number of classes to identify.
Various hidden layer attributes were used, varying between 1-3 hidden layers, with
5-20 neurons per layer. Multiple iterations were accomplished using new training
and testing groups. Results from performance analysis consistently settled to 10−2 or
better. The best parameters for training this neural network appear to be using two
hidden layers, with 3, then 7 neurons, respectively. The performance plot in Figure
4.2, ROC curve plot in Figure 4.2, and confusion matrices in Table 4.2illustrate these
results.
The selection of port counts with activity was not an effective feature with
regard to a neural network. If a rule is established to signal an alert when a machine
has 25 or more connections, the datasets collected would have yielded only 3 false
alerts, but would have identified 100% of the Nessus and NMAP scanning events.
Second, the identified signatures which indicate malicious activity (other than
scanning) may also be either present or not present; errors arise when feeding these to
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Figure 4.1: The mean squared error of the trained neural network-based classifier
consistently converges to a MSE of 10−3.5 or better, which indicates the features
selected perform very well overall for classifying normal and malicious host-based
activity within the collections gathered.
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Figure 4.2: Upon simulating the trained network against unbiased test data, results
show the features selected perform very well to identify normal and malicious activity.
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a neural network since the incident rate may be too low for the network to learn. A
larger collection would be necessary, along with more training in order to learn these
features. However, if the features identified from labeling data as malicious when
there may be a low normalized number in the data.
4.2.1 Alerts Triggered: Data Understanding ANN. The seven rules learned
through data understanding led to 226 true positive alerts triggered through the ANN.
Using the rules learned through data understanding, there were 10 false negative alerts
and 16 false positive alerts from across the three collections. Tables 4.3 - 4.5 provide
summarized views of the alerts triggered by the data understanding ANN, along with
the alert’s relation to events during the controlled collections.
Table 4.3: The data understanding ANN generated 3
alerts, 3 false positive alerts, and 0 false negatives, per-
taining to the target machine’s network activity during
40 minutes of what is considered normal activity. While
the events were related to valid user activity, the thresh-
old for the number of active ports was likely set too low,
resulting in the false identification of scanning activity.
Data Understanding ANN Alerts - Normal Activity Collection
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
3 20+ active local ports Scanning [17] Surfing Web, 43
ports
1 Total alerts in ”Normal Activity” collection
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Table 4.4: The data understanding ANN generated 85
alerts, with 4 false positives and 11 false negatives (10 of
which were false negatives for Snort as well), pertaining
to the target machine during the 40 minutes of scanning
activity intermixed with periods of normal activity.
Data Understanding ANN Alerts - Scanning Activity Collection
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
1 File IO with net.exe Exploit [n/a] Between scan-
ning events
3 20+ active local ports Scanning [n/a] Surfing Web
1 20+ active local ports Scanning [10] NMap, Intense
Scan
2 20+ active local ports Scanning [11] NMap, Intense
Scan plus UDP
28 20+ active local ports Scanning [12] NMap, Intense
Scan plus TCP
2 20+ active local ports Scanning [13] NMap, Intense
Scan, No Ping
1 20+ active local ports Scanning [15] NMap, Quick
Scan
1 20+ active local ports Scanning [16] NMap, Quick
Scan Plus
2 20+ active local ports Scanning [18] NMap, Regular
Scan
2 20+ active local ports Scanning [19] NMap, Slow Com-
prehensive Scan
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.4 – Continued
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
40 20+ active local ports Scanning [20] Nessus, Aggres-
sive Scan
2 20+ active local ports Scanning [21] Nessus, Stealthy
Scan
85 Total alerts in ”Scanning Activity” collection
Table 4.5: The data understanding ANN generated 164
alerts, with 3 false positives and 5 false negatives (3 of
which were false negatives for Snort as well) pertaining
to the target machine during the nine minute collection
period of intermixed normal and exploit activity.
Data Understanding ANN Alerts - Exploit Activity Collection
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
3 File IO with net.exe Exploit [n/a] No event at this
time
8 File IO with net.exe Exploit [1] metasploit: ad-
duser payload
17 File IO with net.exe,
MUP, mailslot or re-
mote as system
Exploit [3] RShell: connect
network drive from
target to hacker ma-
chine.
2 File IO with Remote
as system
Exploit [4] RShell: interacting
with console.
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.5 – Continued
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
15 File IO with net.exe,
MUP or remote as sys-
tem
Exploit [5] RShell: run ad-
dAdminAccount.bat
50 File IO with MUP,
password dump or re-
mote as system
Exploit [6] RShell: run steal-
passwords.bat
9 File IO with MUP, Re-
mote as system
Exploit [7] RShell: run plant-
Backdoor.bat
4 File IO Remote as sys-
tem
Exploit [11] RShell: run plant-
Backdoor.bat
15 File IO MUP, mailsot,
remote as system
Exploit [13] RShell: run enu-
musersingroups.vbs
7 File IO MUP and Re-
mote as system
Exploit [14] RShell: run cover-
tracks.bat
18 File IO MUP, remote
as system
Exploit [15] RShell: run plan-
tkeylogger.bat
18 File IO MUP, remote
as system
Exploit [15] RShell: run cover-
tracks.bat
4.2.2 Alerts Triggered: Snort IDS. Results were compared to the leading
open source intrusion detection system provided by SourceFire, Snort [64]. Snort
was installed on a Linux virtual machine (Ubuntu version 8.10), configured with
the default rules. Tables 4.6–4.8 provide summarized views of the alerts triggered by
Snort for each collection, along with the alert’s relation to events during the controlled
collections.
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Table 4.6: Snort generated 285 alerts, with 285 false pos-
itives and 0 false negatives, pertaining to the target ma-
chine during 40 minutes of what is considered normal
activity for just one machine.
Snort Alerts - Normal Activity Collection
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
6 COMMUNITY WEB-
MISC mod jrun over-
flow attempt
Web Application At-
tack
[16] Powerpoint insert
online clipart
[17] Internet Explorer
use
235 MISC UPnP mal-
formed advertisement
Misc Attack [n/a] Valid alerts, but
not related a scripted
event
12 SCAN UPnP service
discover attempt
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
[n/a] Valid alerts, but
not related a scripted
event
11 WEB-MISC Lotus
Notes .exe script
source download
attempt
Web Application At-
tack
[17] Internet Explorer
use
2 WEB-MISC Invalid
HTTP Version String
Detection of a non-
standard protocol or
event
[17] Internet Explorer
use
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.6 – Continued
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
6 NETBIOS SMB Ses-
sion Setup NTMLSSP
unicode asn1 overflow
attempt
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
[2] Outlook short
email
[9] Word
[n/a] One event be-
tween steps
1 ICMP Destination
Unreachable Commu-
nication Administra-
tively Prohibited
Misc activity [17] Internet Explorer
use
10 NETBIOS SMB IPC$
unicode share access
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
[2] Outlook short
email
[9] Word
[17] Internet Explorer
use
[20] Word, Excel,
Powerpoint together
[n/a] One event be-
tween steps
1 (http inspect) U EN-
CODING
(not listed) [17] Internet Explorer
use
1 (portscan) UDP
Portsweep
(not listed) [17] Internet Explorer
use
285 TOTAL ALERTS IN ”NORMAL ACTIVITY”
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Table 4.7: Snort generated 561 alerts, with 4 false posi-
tives and 9 false negatives, pertaining to the target ma-
chine during 40 minutes of what intermixed scanning and
normal activity for just one machine.
Snort Alerts - Scanning Activity Collection
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
4 COMMUNITY WEB-
MISC mod jrun over-
flow attempt
Web Application At-
tack
[n/a] Valid alerts, but
not related a scripted
event
6 SCAN nmap XMAS Attempted Informa-
tion Leak
[10] NMAP intense
scan [11] NMAP in-
tense scan + UDP [12]
NMAP intense scan
+ TCP [13] NMAP
intense scan no ping
[16] NMAP quick scan
plus [19] NMAP slow
progressive scan
6 (snort decoder): Tcp
Window Scale Option
found with length ¿ 14
[10] NMAP intense
scan [11] NMAP in-
tense scan + UDP [12]
NMAP intense scan
+ TCP [13] NMAP
intense scan no ping
[16] NMAP quick scan
plus [19] NMAP slow
progressive scan
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.7 – Continued
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
205 MISC UPnP mal-
formed advertisement
Misc Attack [10] NMAP intense
scan (11 alerts) [12]
NMAP intense scan
+ TCP [15] NMAP
quick scan [20] NES-
SUS aggressive scan
[21] NESSUS lighter
scan
6 SNMP public access
udp
Attempted Informa-
tion Leak
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
2 SNMP private access
udp
Attempted Informa-
tion Leak
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
12 SNMP request udp Attempted Informa-
tion Leak
[11] NMAP intense
scan + UDP [19]
NMAP slow progres-
sive scan [20] NESSUS
aggressive scan [21]
NESSUS lighter scan
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.7 – Continued
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
6 SNMP request tcp Attempted Informa-
tion Leak
[11] NMAP intense
scan + UDP [12]
NMAP intense scan
+ TCP [13] NMAP
intense scan no ping
[18] NMAP regular
scan [20] NESSUS
aggressive scan [21]
NESSUS lighter scan
2 SNMP trap udp Attempted Informa-
tion Leak
[11] NMAP intense
scan + UDP [19]
NMAP slow progres-
sive scan
4 SNMP trap tcp Attempted Informa-
tion Leak
[12] NMAP intense
scan + TCP [20] NES-
SUS aggressive scan
[21] NESSUS lighter
scan
7 SNMP AgentX/tcp
request
Attempted Informa-
tion Leak
NMAP and Nessus
(steps 10, 12, 13, 18,
20, 21)
12 TFTP Get Potentially Bad Traf-
fic
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.7 – Continued
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
2 MISC AFS access Misc activity [20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
2 MISC xdmcp info
query
Attempted Informa-
tion Leak
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
17 SCAN UPnP service
discover attempt
Detection of a Net-
work Scan
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
2 MS-SQL ping attempt Misc activity [20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
2 NETBIOS DCERPC
Remote Activation
bind attempt
Attempted Adminis-
trator Privilege Gain
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
101 NETBIOS SMB-
DS Session Setup
AndX request unicode
username overflow
attempt
Attempted Adminis-
trator Privilege Gain
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
79 NETBIOS SMB-DS
IPC$ unicode share
access
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.7 – Continued
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
2 NETBIOS SMB-DS
D$ unicode share
access
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
[21] NESSUS lighter
scan
2 NETBIOS SMB-DS
C$ unicode share
access
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
[21] NESSUS lighter
scan
4 NETBIOS SMB-DS
ADMIN$ unicode
share access
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
[21] NESSUS lighter
scan
3 DDOS mstream client
to handler
Attempted Denial of
Service
[12] NMAP intense
scan + TCP [20] NES-
SUS aggressive scan
[21] NESSUS lighter
scan
9 NETBIOS SMB-DS
repeated logon failure
Unsuccessful User
Privilege Gain
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan
6 NETBIOS SMB Ses-
sion Setup NTMLSSP
unicode asn1 overflow
attempt
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
[1] ws ping [10]
NMAP intense scan
[n/a] 4 alerts between
events
10 NETBIOS SMB IPC$
unicode share access
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
[1] ws ping [10]
NMAP intense scan
[n/a] 4 alerts between
events
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.7 – Continued
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
2 NETBIOS SMB-
DS Session Setup
NTMLSSP unicode
asn1 overflow attempt
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
2 NETBIOS DCERPC
IActivation little en-
dian bind attempt
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
2 ICMP L3retriever
Ping
Attempted Informa-
tion Leak
ws ping and NMAP
(steps 1, 10)
6 ICMP PING NMAP Attempted Informa-
tion Leak
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
1 ICMP traceroute
ipopts
Attempted Informa-
tion Leak
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan
4 BAD-TRAFFIC tcp
port 0 traffic
Misc activity [20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
4 SCAN Amanda client
version request
Attempted Informa-
tion Leak
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
1 WEB-CGI wrap ac-
cess
Attempted Informa-
tion Leak
Between scan events
2 (http inspect) OVER-
SIZE REQUEST-URI
DIRECTORY
Between scan events
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.7 – Continued
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
1 (http inspect) DOU-
BLE DECODING
ATTACK
Between scan events
15 (portscan) TCP
Portscan
[1] ws ping [10]
NMAP intense scan
[12] NMAP intense
scan + TCP [13]
NMAP intense scan
no ping [15] NMAP
quick scan [17] NMAP
quick tracert [18]
NMAP regular scan
[20] NESSUS aggres-
sive scan [21] NESSUS
lighter scan
5 (portscan) UDP
Portscan
NMAP and Nessus
(steps 11, 19, 20, 21)
3 (portscan) UDP
Portsweep
NMAP one one Nes-
sus (steps 10, 19, 20)
561 TOTAL ALERTS IN ”SCANNING ACTIVITY”
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Table 4.8: Snort generated 57 alerts, 0 false positive
alerts, and 6 false negative alerts pertaining to the ex-
ploit collection.
Snort Alerts - Exploit Activity Collection
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
# Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
42 MISC UPnP malformed
advertisement
Misc Attack [n/a] Valid alerts, but
not related a scripted
event
2 NETBIOS SMB Ses-
sion Setup AndX re-
quest unicode username
overflow attempt
Attempted Administra-
tor Privilege Gain
[2] Metasploit reverse
shell start, [3] Metas-
ploit net use p: back to
blackhat box
2 NETBIOS SMB-DS
IPC$ share access
Generic Protocol Com-
mand Decode
[1] Metasploit adduser
payload, [2] Metasploit
reverse shell start
2 ICMP L3retriever Ping Attempted Information
Leak
[2] Metasploit reverse
shell start
4 NETBIOS SMB IPC$
unicode share access
Generic Protocol Com-
mand Decode
[5] Metasploit rshell ad-
dadminaccount.bat
1 ATTACK-
RESPONSES Microsoft
cmd.exe banner
Successful Administra-
tor Privilege Gain
[9] Netcat session
started
2 ATTACK-
RESPONSES directory
listing
Potentially Bad Traffic [n/a] Valid alerts, but
not related a scripted
event
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.8 – Continued
Alerts Alert Trigger Classification EVENT
2 NETBIOS SMB Session
Setup NTMLSSP uni-
code asn1 overflow at-
tempt
Generic Protocol Com-
mand Decode
[15] Netcat plantkeylog-
ger.bat
57 TOTAL ALERTS IN ”ATTACK ACTIVITY”
Table 4.9: Comparison between Snort and ANN Ruleset
false positive and false negative alerts.
Dataset Ruleset True Positive
Alerts
False Positive
Alerts
False Negative
Alerts
Normal Snort 0 285 0
ANN 0 3 0
Scanning Snort 548 4 9
ANN 70 4 11
Exploit Snort 57 0 6
ANN 156 3 5
Total Snort 605 289 15
ANN 226 10 16
Overall, the methodology presented in this thesis resulted just 10 false positives
and 16 false negatives, a 91.5% reduction when compared to Snort IDS’ 289 false
positives and 15 false negatives. Additionally, six events involving malicious remote
shell connections were detected through the features discovered via data understand-
ing which were not detected by Snort, and three times as many true positive alerts
for exploit activity were generated by the data understanding ANN.
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With regard to scanning, it is noted that Snort reported significantly more
true positive alerts than the ANN method. Conversely, the ANN method reported
significantly more true positive exploit activity alerts. As a NIDS, Snort signals an
alert for each packet meeting a specific signature, such as xmas tree scan or syn flood.
The focus of this body of work was not to duplicate all the alerts that another system
can create, but to discover a set of forensic data features which indicate a genre of
events while minimizing false alerts. Also, recall that the data is summarized by
two-second timeframe (see Section 3.2.1) with the ANN method for data alignment,
which will naturally yield lower number of alerts. While the numbers appear skewed,
a better comparison is between false positive and false negative alerts, as this is where
one tool or the other misidentified normal activity as scanning or exploitation activity,
or vice versa.
A system administrator who were to rely solely on Snort to perform intrusion
detection would need to filter through 289 alerts to find the truly malicious traffic, a
laborious and time consuming task for analyzing just 90 minutes of activity. Addi-
tionally, if this administrator were to miss the one alert which indicated the beginning
of a reverse shell connection, no additional alerts would have tipped off the admin-
istrator of a potential intrusion. The data understanding ANN identified six exploit
events which Snort did not alert at all, and a high number of alerts during those time
periods.
Nine of the sixteen false negatives revolve around events which Snort had also
not identified as malicious scanning events: lightweight scanning which falls below
the thresholds developed for identifying scanning events, such as produced via ping or
traceroute routines. The remaining false negatives resulted from the lack of correlated
forensic evidence within the data collected. Of the ten false positives, six related to two
periods of legitimate web browsing, where the maximum number of simultaneously
active ports threshold was surpassed. The remaining four resulted from the presence
of net.exe or net1.exe within a File IO event. Thresholds for a counts of each of
these events could reduce false positive rates, but at the risk of producing additional
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false negatives. Additional data collections can help to establish better baselines for
thresholds, but a small number of false positives or false negatives is unavoidable.
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V. Conclusions
This body of work delivers a methodology for collecting, parsing and analyzing live
forensic data for the purpose of identifying relevant host-based intrusion detection fea-
tures. An instrumented environment was established to perform host-based forensic
data collections during periods of normal, scanning and exploit activity. An extensi-
ble Java-based framework was developed to parse sensor data from six sensors into
sets of features for analysis. A SQL server database was built to aggregate and sum-
marize forensic records, as well as identify telling features of an intrusion. In order to
test the effectiveness of the selected features, an ANN was trained to classify normal,
scanning and exploit activity based on selected features. The instrumented envi-
ronment, sensor-parsing framework, SQL server database and ANN are all re-usable
components for future work in this or related areas.
This research identified seven host-based intrusion detection features, which not
only aided in detection of malicious activity, but also greatly reduced the incidence
of false positive alerts when compared to Snort IDS. These features are:
1. High count of local ports with activity.
2. File IO activity involving a /mailslot/.
3. File IO activity involving /mailslot/Nessus.
4. File IO activity involving /mup/.
5. File IO activity involving net.exe
6. Authentication File Dump Feature
7. Remote as System feature
Using only this small set of features, more accurate and sustained reporting
of malicious events occurred, though both the identification of events not discovered
by Snort IDS, and the reduction of false positive alerts which must be filtered by
a network defense technician. The methodology presented in this thesis identified
six events of sustained malicious remote activity which Snort IDS had not generated
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alerts for. Additionally, the methodology yielded just 26 false positive alerts; a 91%
reduction to Snort’s 298 false positive alerts generated from the same collections.
Data understanding can be applied to host based intrusion detection research
to minimize false reporting of malicious events, easing the administrative burden
to network defenders, and providing for better decision quality information as to the
events taking place on the host system. Additionally, the results of a study performed
via data understanding can aid in the development of more effective and efficient live
forensic sensors. By choosing what data to attend to, such a study can identify the
minimum set of features a sensor needs to detect a malicious event, resulting in a
lighter impact to system resources by the sensor.
5.1 Need for Sustained feature discovery research
Communication systems, their vulnerabilties and the threats which challenge
their confidentiality, integrity, and availability, are constantly evolving. Neglecting
to search through forensic evidence to identify features which help to detect these
threats will further divide human trust in computing systems. What if instead of
focusing on the signature of a specific threat, developers created IDS which set their
sights on common forensic tripwires an attacker would disturb in order to successfully
attack a network; the behavior of programs vs what programs physically look like at
the byte level. Years of threat modeling research have solidified the definition of key
behavioral building blocks believed to be foundational for successful network attacks.
Depending on the goal(s) of the attack vector, one or more of these building blocks are
used to compromise a system: footprinting, scanning, enumerating, gaining access,
escalating privilege level, pilfering, covering tracks, creating back doors or executing
a denial of service. If detection is focused toward reasoning about which stage an
attack is in, the right COA (Course of Action) to mitigate the threat. The earlier this
detection is accomplished, the better chances system administrators have to intercept
andmitigate the threat before it can cause irrevocable damage.
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5.2 Future Works
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are a number of assumptions and known
limitations for this research. Among these were the fact that collections were done in
a controlled environment, the tools chosen for collecting forensic data consumed a lot
of system resources, the intractability of the search space, and optimality conditions.
This research was done in a relatively closed environment, with minimal out-
side interference in order to know what events are transpiring. This was important
for the identification of features, as it enabled the research to focus on data sur-
rounding malicious activity as compared to data which were assumed normal activity
periods. However, future efforts to test the effectiveness of features identified data
understanding could involve collections in larger, more operationally realistic network
environments. Other attacks and attack tools could be used to further expand and
validate the set of identified features deemed relevant to detecting malicious activ-
ity. These attacks could include the launching of denial of service, virus, botnet and
rootkit attacks.
Another potential future work is the development of lightweight forensic sensors,
such that live collection has minimal impact on the system being monitored. Such a
sensor could monitor for the features discovered by this and related research efforts,
and would likely involve the development of low level methods, such as intercepting
system and Application Program Interface (API) calls and other inter-process com-
munication. There are other areas which can be explored using data understanding
which were not explored through this research effort, such as performing memory
captures or monitoring other I/O ports or specific applications for malicious activity.
As mentioned, the intrusion detection search space is humongous. While an
analysis was performed to find relevant single-element forensic features within the
forensic evidence, it was not an exhaustive search. A more exhaustive search of
permutations between any/all forensic data elements may yield better results and
identify new features which can be used to improve detection rates and work to
99
further minimize false negative alerts. Additional permutations could be developed
number of different ways, to include combinations of features for a given observation,
timing and flow-based analysis between multiple observations.
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Appendix A. Forensic Toolkit
A.1 Tools
The sensors listed in Table A are used to capture live forensic data for later
analysis.
A.2 Scripts
The following scripts are written as a batch to launch forensic tools in a consis-
tent and repeatable manner. Although care was taken to choose tools which minimized
their impact to system resources, there is a noticeable performance hit (memory and
processor) for all the data captures to files. During captures, with no additional
activity other than sensors running, processor utilization hovered around 35% and
memory utilization was around 185MB. The search for lightweight live forensic tools
is a challenge in its own right, and should be accomplished prior to any similar research
efforts.
The first file in the toolkit is the main “controller” script, named Autoexec.vbs.
The controller is written in Microsoft Visual Basic Script, and is run from the com-
mand line and interpreted with Windows Script Host v5.6 (included with Microsoft
Windows XP, SP2). The controller script creates a directory to save forensic data
collections to, and launches a DOS batch program which, in turn, kicks off each of
Forensic Programs Used
Application/Sensor Source
Windows Script Host v5.6 Included with MS Windows XP, SP2
logman.exe v5.1.2600.2180 Included with MS Windows XP, SP2
tshark.exe v1.2.4 Included with Wireshark v1.2.4
listdlls.exe v2.25 www.sysinternals.com
logonsession.exe v1.1 www.sysinternals.com
pslist.exe v1.28 www.sysinternals.com
tcpvcon.exe v2.54 www.sysinternals.com
Table A.1: Executable files used as part of the forensic toolkit (on the target
machine). If you’re unable to secure the same version, parsing the output may require
rework.
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the forensic tools in the toolkit in succession. For each experiment, these tools are
launched by running Autoexec.vbs from the Windows console.
To use these scripts, save each of the below sections to the file names indicated.
Download the executables listed in Table A and save them to the system to be mon-
itored. Adjust file paths in batch files as necessary to match the location you saved
the executables to.
A.3 Controller Script: Autoexec.vbs
’*************************************************************************
’* AUTHOR: Capt Joe Erskine *
’* PURPOSE: Create directory to store forensic data *
’*************************************************************************
’*************************************************************************
’* The getDateString function builds & returns a string in the format of *
’* YYYY.MM.DD.HH.MM.SS *
’*************************************************************************
Function getDateString()
Dim nowDate
nowDate = Now()
getDateString = "" & Year(nowDate) & "."
If Len(Month(nowDate)) = 1 Then
getDateString = getDateString & "0"
End If
getDateString = getDateString & month(nowDate) & "."
If Len(Day(nowDate)) = 1 Then
getDateString = getDateString & "0"
End If
getDateString = getDateString & Day(nowDate) & "."
If Len(Hour(nowDate)) = 1 Then
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getDateString = getDateString & "0"
End If
getDateString = getDateString & Hour(nowDate) & "."
If Len(Minute(nowDate)) = 1 Then
getDateString = getDateString & "0"
End If
getDateString = getDateString & Minute(nowDate) & "."
If Len(Second(nowDate)) = 1 Then
getDateString = getDateString & "0"
End If
getDateString = getDateString & Second(nowDate)
End Function
’*************************************************************************
’* The makeDirectory is method is responsible for creating a directory. *
’* The directory can be several layers deep, and if parent directories *
’* don’t exist, it creates them. If the directory already exists, it is *
’* left alone. *
’*************************************************************************
’*************************************************************************
’* makeDirectory() function *
’* Create a directory as specified by the newPath string *
’* adapted from... *
’* diablopup.blogspot.com/2007/04/vbscript-fun-create-file-system.html *
’*************************************************************************
Const CONST_DIRALREADYEXISTED = -2
Const CONST_DIRCREATIONFAILURE = -1
Const CONST_DIRCREATIONSUCCESS = 0
Function makeDirectory(newPath)
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Dim outputFileObject, path, count, myArray, length
Set outputFileObject = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
If outputfileObject.FolderExists(newPath) Then
makeDirectory = CONST_DIRALREADYEXISTED
Else
path = ""
count = 0
myArray = Split(newPath, "\")
length = UBound(myArray)
While count <= length
path = path + myArray(count) + "\"
count = count + 1
If outputfileObject.FolderExists(path) Then
Else
outputfileObject.CreateFolder(path)
End If
Wend
If outputfileObject.FolderExists(newPath) Then
makeDirectory = CONST_DIRCREATIONSUCCESS
Else
makeDirectory = CONST_DIRCREATIONFAILURE
End If
End If
End Function
’*************************************************************************
’* main() function. *
’* Create directory structure for storing forensic data, then call our *
’* forensic tool launcher program, passing the file name *
’*************************************************************************
Sub main()
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dim forensicDataDirectory
Set sh = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
forensicDataDirectory = "Z:\Shared Documents\SensorData\" & _
getDateString
Select Case makeDirectory(forensicDataDirectory)
Case CONST_DIRCREATIONSUCCESS
WScript.Echo "Created directory: " & forensicDataDirectory
sh.SendKeys "start ""Forensic Tool Launcher"" /min "
sh.SendKeys "ForensicScan.bat """
sh.SendKeys forensicDataDirectory & """ {ENTER}"
Case CONST_DIRCREATIONFAILURE
WScript.Echo "ERROR, could not create directory: """
WScript.Echo forensicDataDirectory & """... Exiting script"
WScript.Quit(1)
Case CONST_DIRALREADYEXISTED
WScript.Echo "ERROR, directory: """ & forensicDataDirectory
WScript.Echo """ already exists... Exiting script"
WScript.Quit(1)
End Select
End Sub
’*************************************************************************
’* Call main function... *
’*************************************************************************
main
’*************************************************************************
’* END OF SCRIPT *
’*************************************************************************
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A.4 Batch program: ForensicScan.bat
@echo off
break=on
cls
echo.
echo *********************************************************************
echo * LFTB Live Forensic Tool Scanner v. 1.0 *
echo * AUTHOR: Joe Erskine, Capt, USAF *
echo * PURPOSE: Perform live forensic data collections *
echo * Log of captures being written to log file listed below. *
echo *********************************************************************
echo.
echo Press [CTRL]+C to terminate
echo.
type C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\etc\services > "%~1\services.services"
cd "C:\Documents and Settings\user\Desktop\Cyber Tools\2.0 Sensors"
REM Launch separate process (command window) to capture network traffic
start "TShark" /min tshark.bat "%~1"
REM stop the threads event trace capture (if running), then start new one
logman threads stop
logman threads start
REM Launch separate process (console window) to capture process snapshots
start "ProcessSnapshot" /min processes.bat "%~1"
REM Launch Performance monitor trace using Microsoft’s logman utility
REM You must configure a trace log called "threads" before running logman
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logman threads start
rem All files generated here are text-based, but their filetypes
rem are customized for identifying which parser to use in our java program
rem (So, do not change file exensions if using our java app unless
rem those changes are reflected in the program as well)
REM **********************************************************************
REM * Iteratively capture snapshots of logonsessions, tcp/udp network *
REM * connections to processes, and dlls associated with processes *
REM **********************************************************************
SET i=1
:TOPOFLOOP
cls
echo.
echo %date% %time%: Initiating forensic scans (round %i%)
echo Press [CTRL]+C at any time to terminate
echo.
echo FORENSIC START TIMESTAMP: %date% %time% > %1\%i%.logonsessions
Toolkit\logonsessions.exe /p >> %1\%i%.logonsessions
echo FORENSIC STOP TIMESTAMP: %date% %time% >> %1\%i%.logonsessions
echo FORENSIC START TIMESTAMP: %date% %time% > %1\%i%.tcpvcon
Toolkit\tcpvcon.exe -a -c >> %1\%i%.tcpvcon
echo FORENSIC STOP TIMESTAMP: %date% %time% >> %1\%i%.tcpvcon
echo FORENSIC START TIMESTAMP: %date% %time% > %1\%i%.listdlls
Toolkit\listdlls.exe >> %1\%i%.listdlls
echo FORENSIC STOP TIMESTAMP: %date% %time% >> %1\%i%.listdlls
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cscript //nologo sleep.vbs 1000
SET /a i=%i%+1
GOTO TOPOFLOOP
REM **********************************************************************
REM * END OF BATCH PROGRAM *
REM **********************************************************************
A.5 Batch Program: tshark.bat
@echo off
echo *********************************************************************
echo * Starting tshark to capture network packets *
echo * Press [CTRL]-C to stop capture *
echo *********************************************************************
echo.
"C:\Program Files\Wireshark\tshark.exe" -p -w %1\tshark.pcap
A.6 Batch Program: processes.bat
@echo off
echo *********************************************************************
echo * Starting process snapshots (at two-second intervals) *
echo * Press [CTRL]-C to stop capture *
echo *********************************************************************
echo.
echo Starting process snapshots to "%~1%\processes.pslistx"
sysinternals\pslist.exe -x -s -r 2 >> "%~1%\processes.pslistx"
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Appendix B. Normal Activity Scripts
The script shown in Figure B.1 was planned in an effort to provide some notional
“Normal” activity. It is not intended to capture the totality of what a person can do
on a computer, but to run the computer through a few common “end user” activities,
such as using a few client applications (client only and minimal client/server), using
email (client/server activity), browsing web sites. In the interest of keeping collections
small, the activities are admittedly more densely scheduled than a typical user may
implement them. It is important to note that the purpose for these scripts is purely for
data collection in support of this thesis, and not intended for user modeling research.
When running a capture, the experimenter should annotate start/stop times for
tracing through the data after the collection is complete.
NOTE - Initially, the author wrote a series of WSH scripts to automate normal
activity through a series of sendkeys() calls. However, while a “cool” concept, these
scripts were highly dependent on system timing, and if the processor was bogged
down, the scripts would fail (repeatedly). Those efforts were abandoned for this,
more manual process.
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Figure B.1: “Normal activity” collections were performed by launching our sensors,
followed by carrying out this series of activities. Each event’s start and stop times
were recorded for later analysis.
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Appendix C. Cyber Attack Scripts
The script shown in Figures C.1 and C.2 were planned in an effort to provide some
notional “Scanning” and “Exploit” activity. These scripts are not meant to capture
the totality of what an attacker can do on a computer, but to run the computer
through a few common “black hat” activities, such as using Nessus, MetaSploit and
BackOrifice. In the interest of keeping collections small, the activities were split into
two collection periods, and are admittedly more densely scheduled than a typical
hacker who knows nothing about the system under attack may implement them. It
is important to note that the purpose for these scripts is purely for data collection in
support of this thesis, and not intended for user modeling research.
As with the “normal activity” capture, the experimenter should annotate start/stop
times for tracing through the data after the collection is complete.
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Figure C.1: “Scanning activity” collections were performed by launching our sensors
on our target system, followed by carrying out this series of activities from the black
hat system. Each event’s start and stop times were recorded for later analysis.
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Figure C.2: “Exploit activity” collections were performed by launching our sensors
on our target system, followed by carrying out this series of activities from the black
hat system. Each event’s start and stop times were recorded for later analysis.
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